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Abstract 
In this work we offer an analysis of economic forecasting from two points of view: 
firstly, we analyze the historical interpretation of the time concept in ancient Egypt, Old 
Testament and ancient Greece; secondly, we assess the current state of economic 
forecasting accuracy, the empirical analysis being primarily based on the IMF data.  We 
analyze the optimism bias presence in the IMF forecasts for the GDP growth rate and 
inflation rate, in a dataset of 30 selected countries, in the period between 2000 and 2010 
years.  We find the presence of optimism bias in both observed variables.  Additionally, 
we evaluate the IMF forecasting performance of 15 developed versus 15 developing 
countries and find that on average the predictions for the developed countries are more 
accurate as compared to the developing countries. 
Keywords economic forecasting, optimism bias, forecast evaluation, 
prophecies, forecasting history, forecasting accuracy, 
forecasting biases, forecasting evolution 
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Topic characteristics : My research will be focused on economic forecasting. Its state 
in the Ancient times (Ancient Egypt, Old Testament, Ancient Greece) in terms of 
indicators, methods and successfulness of the forecasting goals will be analyzed. 
Further the biases which deteriorate the exactness of performed economic forecasting 
will be discussed, mainly assessing the different types of predictions (interpretational 
bias), as well as the human behavior bias from the point of view of the “this-time-is-
different” syndrome, bounded rationality, affective forecasting, and animal spirit bias. 
The empirical part of the thesis will be dedicated to assessing the relationship between 
forecasted and real data, by evaluating the optimism bias versus affecting forecasting. 
Moreover, a comparison between the forecasting accuracy will be done in order to 
assess the forecasting accuracy of the developed countries as compared to the 
developing ones.  
Hypotheses: 1. The forecast of the positive-meaning economic variables is on average 
overestimated. 2. The forecast of the negative-meaning economic variables is on 
average underestimated. 3. Developed countries as compared to the developing ones are 
provided with a more accurate forecasting. 
Methodology: A panel data for GDP growth rate and inflation rate will be used. Based 
on this data the comparison between forecasting performance of the developed and 
developing countries will be performed using the following methodologies: mean 
squared error, root mean squared error, mean absolute deviation. The optimism bias will 
be assessed based on the estimation of the forecasted data on the actual data, the model 
 
 
being subject to both random and fixed effects analysis and comparison of the outputs. 
Consequently, the F-test will be used to assess the coefficients value. 
Outline: 
1. Introduction 
2. Historical Overview of Economic Forecasting 
3. Determinant Biases in Economic Forecasting: 
4. Optimism Bias and Affective Forecasting 




Alchian, A. (1950): “Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory.” The Journal of 
Political Economy 58(3): pp. 211-221. 
Diebold, F.X. (1998): “The Past, Present and Future of Macroeconomic Forecasting.” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 12, pp. 175-192. 
Makridakis, S. (1993): “Accuracy measures: theoretical and practical concerns.” 
International Journal of Forecasting 9: pp. 527-552. 
Reinhart, C. & K. Rogoff (2009): “This Time is Different. Eight centuries of Financial 
Folly.” New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Sedlacek, T. (2011): “Economics of Good and Evil: The Quest for Economic Meaning 
from Gilgamesh to Wall Street.” New York: Oxford University Press, Inc. 
Tversky, A. & D. Kahneman (1974): “Judgments under uncertainty: Heuristics and 
biases.” Science 185 (4157): pp. 1124–1131. 
Werthf, L., Strack F. & J. Förster (2002): “Certainty and Uncertainty: The Two Faces 
of the Hindsight Bias.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 87(2): 
pp. 323-341. 
Wilson, T. & D. Gilbert (2005): “Affective Forecasting Knowing What to Want.” 













One of the main interests of economists is to forecast the future of systems behaviour.  
The birth of scientific macroeconomic forecasting, as Hawkins (2005) mentions, is a 
result of Keynesian revolution, when the number of quantitative-econometric models 
started to progressively increase.  In this work, however, the analysis of economic 
forecasting will start with the very ancient roots and will discuss the time-concept 
interpretation as well as the influence of ancient methodologies of predictions on the 
current state of economic forecasting. 
Such an approach to evaluate forecasting as a concept is, however, an unusual one given 
the wide variety of economic researches analyzing the empirical (numerical) aspect of 
predictions versus the poor exploration of the historical sides. 
After pursuing an introduction to history, the biases influencing the current economic 
forecasting accuracy will be analyzed.  We primarily consider the human behaviour 
biases which, due to their recognized influence on the economic development in the last 
period, developed into a separate science: behavioral economics. 
The human behaviour influence on the predictions performance is channeled not only via 
erroneous interpretation of the forecasts (e.g. through hindsight bias), misuse of 
information (e.g. identity concept), but also via upwards or downwards deviations at the 
level of forecasts themselves which can be caused by the optimism bias.  The former one 
is evaluated in this work. 
Although the optimism bias has been already analyzed in different researches, most of 
them focus on either large datasets but older time-periods (e.g. Timmerman (2006) 
analyzed the data for 178 countries in the 1990-2003 period; Tagaci & Kucur (2006) – 
109 countries with the data for 1994-2003 years; etc.), or more recent periods, but small 
datasets (e.g. Julio and Esperança (2012) – dataset for 1994-2010, in G7 countries). The 
value-added brought by our analysis is the combination of a relatively larger number of 
countries (30 countries) with the most recent available data (2000-2010). 
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From the other side, we analyze not only the human behaviour, but also the “forecasting 
errors behaviour”. Usually the forecasting errors are interpreted as a methodological tool 
to compare several forecasting methods (models). However, there have been identified no 
attempts for comparing the forecasting performance of certain groups of countries. 
Respectively, we evaluate and compare the economic forecasting accuracy of a group of 
developed and one of developing countries. 
The respective idea is transformed into the hypothesis that, given a more volatile 
economic growth in developing countries and their specialization in fewer economic 
sectors (non-diversification), we consider the economic forecasts for developed countries 
being more accurate as opposed to least developed countries where higher errors are 
expected. 
Respectively, the objective of this thesis is to analyze the accuracy and biases of 
economic forecasting (primarily based on the IMF data) by first introducing the concept 
of forecasting from historical perspective. The reasoning behind the importance of this 
subject lies in the impact of economic predictions on the economies development. 
This impact is channeled via policy-makers who base their decisions on the information 
about the potential state of the economy provided by forecasts, as it is claimed by Elliott 
& Timmermann (2008), the value of the forecasts can be assessed only via examining the 
outputs of policies and decisions which were taken relying on forecasted data. 
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 is a backward induction analysis of ancient 
forecasting regarded from three perspectives: ancient Egypt, Old Testament and ancient 
Greece.  We introduce the ancient interpretation of the time concept, as well as the 
methodological differences between current forecasting tools and ancient ones. 
Chapter 3 covers the main biases related to human behavior including: this-time-is-
different-syndrome, bounded rationality, animal spirit bias, unbounded emotionality.  The 
chapter also discusses the importance of distinguishing between unconditional and 
conditional forecasting as suggested by Popper (1959).   
Chapter 4 addresses the question on economic forecasting performance, comparing the 
accuracy of IMF forecasts in 15 developed and 15 developing countries.  Using several 
technical measures, involving the forecast error as the main indicator, the respective 
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comparative analysis attempts to show the existence of a negative correlation between the 
level of countries’ development and the forecasting inaccuracy. 
Chapter 5 introduces the optimism bias and tests its presence in the IMF forecasts for the 
GDP growth rate and inflation rate.  The analysis is based on two sets of tests: the test for 
efficiency of projections and the test for unbiasedness of projections, according to the 
methodology of Barrionuevo (1993). 






II. HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE TIME CONCEPT 
 
The reason for learning about the economic forecasting starting with its roots is 
wonderfully explained by Aristotle, who said: 
“If you would understand anything, observe its beginning and its development.”  
Following this logic, as long as economists did not perform excellently in making fully 
accurate predictions, it is worth going deeper into the past and analyzing the birth and 
development of the science of forecasting. 
It is generally accepted that macroeconomic forecasts, as we interpret them today, are a 
product of the Keynesian revolution, given that official forecasts started to be regularly 
produced after the World War II, as Hawkins (2005) mentions.  But prediction of the 
future was a concern for the humanity long before Keynes birth.  And the way today 
people interpret the future is certainly an output of the way the future was interpreted 
thousands of years ago.  Respectively, the three historical perspectives on forecasting and 
on the time-concept that are analyzed in this work refer to ancient Egypt, Old Testament 
and ancient Greece. 
The reason for selecting these three pages from the human history lies behind two 
arguments.  Firstly, each of them had and has a strong influence on the humanity: ancient 
Egypt – as one the very first civilizations, Old Testament – as one of the most powerful 
religion platforms, and ancient Greece – as a mathematics and philosophy building block.  
Secondly, all three of them are interconnected: ancient Egypt is frequently quoted in the 
Old Testament, while ancient Greece has its roots in the ancient Egyptian rationale, given 
that several well-known Greek thinkers got their education in Egypt, being accused of, 
consequently, stealing Egyptian philosophy, as it is claimed in James (2010). 
In this frame, the reason of this chapter is not to solve the problems that economic 
forecasting encounters, but to identify and asses how it all started, what was the ancients 
interpretation of the time concept, what was the methodology to predict the future, what 
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difference exists between the ancient methods to foresee the future and the current ones,  
and whether there is anything we succeeded to improve comparing to them, so far.  
2.1. Ancient Egypt 
“Sometimes, however, in its affection for 
forecasting, economics exhibits a nostalgia 
for magic.” (McCloskey 1992) 
Egypt is one of the very first civilizations in the world.  Fully understanding the spirit and 
evolution of Egypt can hardly be done even by the Egyptians themselves whose identity 
and history are simply an undiscovered mystery.  Ancient Egypt faced challenges 





, an impressive relationship between people and a river
3
, as well as their 
impressive ability to forget how to read their own language4. 
Egyptians believed in a predetermined future and that their fate was sealed to them by the 
gods at birth. All life circumstances were known by the gods, as Toledano (2004), writes, 
even the date and time of their death.  They also believed that there are days in the 
calendar which will bring sadness, and days which will be full of joy. But even if their 
beliefs were limited by these frames, Egyptians and the Near East in general are 
considered to be the first who developed the basics of philosophy.  
Unlike Greeks, who were the first to develop a system of intellectual principles and fixed 
rules to define philosophy, the Egyptians delivered it as a system of human thoughts.  As 
Allen (1988) writes, for the ancient Egyptians the philosophy and religion were identical, 
and, furthermore, Brier (1981) finds that neither magic was distinguishable from religion. 
According to Toledano (2004), even with the belief in a predetermined future, Egyptians 
still considered that they can convince their gods to modify their initial plans on people’s 
                                                   
1
 “[…] pharaon Pepi II – whose ninety-four-year reign is the longest in the history of the world.” Brier: 
Ancient Egyptian Magic, 17. 
2
 “First Intermediate Period – […] There was such turmoil that the priest-historian Manetho says that, at 
one point, there were seventy kings in seventy days.” Ibid., 18. 
3
 “[…] the history of Egypt became so closely associated with the Nile that to understand the civilization 
one must understand the river.” Ibid., 14. 
4
 “The old man told to Germanicus that he was the only man alive who could read the writings of the 
Egyptians […]. In the early first century A.D., when Germanicus visited Egypt, few could read 
hieroglyphs, and soon any knowledge of the sacred script was to die.” Ibid., 22. 
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fortune. Respectively, the matter of forecasting the future was not only a question related 
to faith and religion, but also to occultism and magic. 
2.1.1. Cyclicality in a Materialized World 
Although the ancient Egyptians interpreted time as having a beginning and an end, the 
period between these two points was not seen as linear, but represented by renewable 
cycles, as Damon (2011) specifies.  Cyclicality is defined by Mircea Eliade (1956) as 
non-uniqueness of all: “nothing being lost and nothing created”, all “have already been 
produced in previous cycles and will be reproduced in subsequent cycles”.  Similarly for 
Egyptians, time was considered an internal, intellectual structure and relationship 
between events, while the neat division of past, present and future did not apply as 
mythical time, according to Damon (2011), could repeat itself, be reversed, and renewed. 





Source: Damon, 2011 
The daily sunrise and sunset (in cycles) were seen by ancient Egyptians as solar 
immortality and represented an example that everyone wished to follow: 
[Sunset represents] a cyclical course of life, return to the origin, overcoming death, 
consummation as conception, and restoration through (re)birth. Here, longing for 
immortality is fulfilled in the cyclical time of endless renewal, as an imitation solis. 
(Assmann 2005, p. 174)  
Egyptians delivered the very first historically registered business cycles, which is 
mentioned in the Old Testament and involves Pharaoh’s dream interpretation by Joseph. 
The dream is explained as a 7-year economic cycle, while the solution is known today as 
fiscal intervention: 
The seven good cows are seven years, and the seven good heads of grain are seven years; 
it is one and the same dream. The seven lean, ugly cows that came up afterward are seven 
years, and so are the seven worthless heads of grain scorched by the east wind: They are 
seven years of famine.” (Bible, Genesis 41:26-27) 
Beginning 
End One life-cycle 
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But cyclicality was not attributed only to material world, but also to supreme entities: 
self-developing gods, who would cyclically renew their power (Allen 1988) and who 
would have the supremacy not only on all grounded things but on the numbers also: 
I am the one who stills the sky […] 
I am the one who silences the earth […]. 
I found myself as a man of infinite number: 
I am the begetter of repeated millions 
Out of the Flood, Out of the Waters, 
Out of the Darkness, out of the Chaos. 
It is I who am Shu, begetter of the gods. 
(Allen 1988, translation of The Cenoptach of Seti, p. 15-19) 
Egyptians, as one of the oldest civilizations on earth, were the source of inspiration even 
for the Greeks who later on advanced in the knowledge of mathematics and geometry 
(Sedlacek 2011).  For Egyptians mathematics was inseparable from philosophy and 
mysticism since all numbers and dimensions had their specific interpretation, as it is for 
example the spatial dimension and specific location of the Egyptian pyramids (specific 
blocks dimension, specific pyramid slope angle, specific ramps structure, etc.). 
The supreme authorities in Egypt were always associated with materialized objects, being 
it water or sun; furthermore, some of the gods were named after particular parts of the 
Nile Valley (Rice 1999).  Generally, Nile River played a special role in Egyptians’ 
history.  The river is mentioned in the very first documented economic forecast related to 
harvest prediction: 
If it was a good year and the river was high, crops were abundant.  If it was a bad year 
and the river was low, it would not cover as much of the land, and crops would be 
reduced.  In times of extremely low river, famine was a reality. (Brier 1981, p.15) 
Thus, the level of the river was a good predictor of harvest expectation.  In nowadays 
economic terms, the harvest can be interpreted as a proxy of GDP, taking into account 
that the economy of Egypt in ancient times was mostly agricultural (Toledano 2004).  
Thus, an economic crisis for the ancient Egypt could be associated with drying Nile. 
According to Brier (1981), unlike Jews, who had a very good delimitation between magic 
and religion, the Egyptians practically mixed the two.  However, even the meaning of 
religion for the ancient Egyptians was different from the way we understand it currently.  
First to mention, Egypt was a theocracy – its political ruler was the God for the country.  
And because he could not be present at all the ceremonies that were happening in the 
country in all the temples, there were certain people delegated that were attending those 
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ceremonies, representing the ruler – the God.  And because these ceremonies took place 
few times a day, every day a week, those people got linked to certain places and their 
position transformed into what we call today priesthood (Brier 1981). 
Cyclicality was present even at the level of those representative priests who were working 
in a system of rotation, the vast majority of the Egyptians having the duty to represent the 
God for a certain number of days per year. And even at that level, the physical 
appearance was the most important element, the representatives having to shave their 
body, bath four times a day, while no moral standards were required or imposed, which 
explained all the stories in which Egyptian priests behaved scandalously (Brier 1981). 
2.1.2. Ancient Egypt Methods to Forecast the Future 
The ones who actually had the power of predicting events, interpreting dreams, make 
someone fall in love, cure an illness were ancient Egyptian magicians – a special rank of 
priests who lived in The House of Life
5
 and could maintain their power only as long as 
they kept away their books from all who could read them (Brier 1981), taking into 
account that there were very few people in the entire Egypt who could read. 
According to Herodotus, the Egyptian Priests possessed super-natural powers, for they 
had been trained in the esoteric philosophy of the Greater Mysteries, and were experts in 
Magic.  They had the power of controlling the minds of men (hypnosis), the power of 
predicting the future (prophecy) and the power over nature. (James 2010, p. 22) 
Secrecy was an important tool to inspire power and grandiosity and without having 
something hidden nobody would be considered to be a predictor (Emerson 2006).  The 
period of ancient Egypt is classically defining the birth of gnosis which is, however, 
technically associated with Greek history.  However, certainly the mystery in religion, the 
dualism between good and evil were defining treats of the ancient Egypt too, as McBride 
writes in his book, The Egyptians Foundations of Gnostic Thoughts, 
[…] Egyptian theology differentiated between “the man of knowledge” (rhw) and the 
ignorant (ihmw). (McBride 1994, p. 57) 
Many Egyptian magical books had the world “secret” in the name: The Book of 
Knowledge of the Secrets of the Laboratory or The Book of Knowing the Secret Forms of 
the God.  These magical books were not just restricted to public, but were also hardly 
                                                   
5
 “House of Life is well known as a place connected with the activities of the most learned scribes of 
Egypt.” Gardiner, The Mansion of Life and The Master of the King’s Largess, 83 
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readable being extremely sophisticated, such that even nowadays some of them can’t be 
translated (Brier 1981). 
Similarly to current economic modeling, the ancient magician-priests discussed on a 
regular basis their secrets and ways to influence the future.  They determined specific 
words and incantations each of them having a very specific role: 
The primary job of the more learned scribes was to clarify religious and magical texts, to 
supply missing gaps in papyri, and to develop new texts and spells when events called for 
them.  They were also responsible for determining the texts to be carved on the walls of 
newly erected temples.  One can imagine these priests arguing for hours over some 
theological point or over the wording of an incantation. (Brier 1981, p. 44) 
But even with a full house of magicians and priests, there was a significant delay when it 
comes to execution and actual forecast of the future.  This gap damaged magicians’ 
reputation, but there was only one person who could never be accused of trickery – the 
pharaoh. 
By virtue of his position the pharaoh was considered more powerful than any other 
magician.  The Egyptians believed that when pharaoh is sick – the whole country is 
underperforming; when the pharaoh is getting old – the country is weaker in battles.  And 
when a pharaoh dies, the country is in a mourning period (Gadalla 2008).  The Egypt’s 
life was considered to be a reflection of pharaoh’s life. 
Another ancient Egyptian mystery is linked to Oracles.  These were stone statues used to 
forecast the future and to obtain divine guidance, being not even one discovered 
nowadays.  According to Brier (1981), Oracles were kept in the very last room in the 
country temples.  They could also act as judges in courts of law, even though they could 
not talk – these were just stone statues, people pretended to understand their answers. 
For the Egyptians themselves, the most relevant predictors were believed to be the 
properly interpreted dreams.  The dreams of materialized objects were considered the 
most powerful ones (Bar 2001).  The oldest book for dreams interpretation, about 4000 
years old, has also Egyptian origins: Egyptian Dream Book.  Not only because of its age, 
but also because of the mysterious character of the Egyptians, many of the interpretations 
are contradictory.  For example, if a man sees himself dead, it is good, predicting a long 
life (Bar 2001); the explanation mechanism remains unknown. 
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Finally, ancient Egypt remains as a remark of magic, secrets, dreams and early cycles in 
the human history.  Even though for the Egyptians the representation of the world and of 
the future was symbolist, mysterious and much more superficial than we interpret it 
today, Egypt gave birth to basic thinking about the future which is supported by both: 
very first documented economic cycle and the very first documented economic forecast. 
Additionally, it established an organizational, structured frame for this thinking: division 
of responsibilities, birth of priesthood, social hierarchy.  Not least to mention, ancient 
Egypt represented a building block and source of inspiration for the forthcoming societies 
(e.g. ancient Greece) to continue exploring philosophical truths about the time. 
2.2. Old Testament 
According to the Old Testament, the world was created using careful knowledge and 
wisdom, out of a very well-organized set of actions and activities performed by a unique 
God during six days
6
.  At the very bottom of world creation there was no chaos but a 
determined history to go though: 
The Jewish understanding of time is linear – it has a beginning and an end.  The Jews 
believe in historical progress, and that progress is in this world. (Sedlacek 2011, p.47) 
The linear time interpretation (Figure 2.2) implies the uniqueness of everything 
happening on the earth, the irreversible and irrevocable process (Cullhed 2001), as well 
as the permanent move toward a goal that lies outside history.  This can be regarded not 
exclusively and mandatory linear but also as a single circle (Jackelen 2005). 





Source: Author’s representation 
                                                   
6
 “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was without form, and void; and 
darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. And God 
said, Let there be light: and there was light. And God saw the light, that it was good: and God divided the 
light from the darkness. And God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night. And the evening 
and the morning were the first day.” Genesis 1:1-31, Old Testament.  





Surely there is a future
7
 and there can be only two options for the state of this future: a 
free-will8 or a predetermined story9.  The contradiction between the two reveals that if 
one holds, the other should be excluded.  The same rationale applied Karl Popper (1959) 
explaining the difference between a conditional and a non-conditional forecasting 
(Chapter III, 3.3.). 
In the Old Testament, however, the hierarchy between people and God is clearly visible 
and, thus, the future is interpreted as an indefinable model and only prophecies have 
access to it.  Still, even with no access to the future the Jewish people were those hoping 
for something more for that future, this is why Jews are considered to give birth to 
capitalism. 
[…] Modern capitalism owes its being to money-lending.  This was the case wherever it 
was necessary to lay out money for initial expenses, or where a business was started […].  
The money-lending activities for the Jews were thus an objective factor in enabling the 
Jews to create, to expand and to assist the capitalistic spirit. (Sombart 1911 [2001], p. 
133) 
Moreover, quantification and numerology was an important detail to which in the Old 
Testament is attributed an essential place.  Even back then, number mysticism (which 
centuries later developed into Kabala school of thought) was a science of knowing the 
past, present and future. It was believed that the Old Testament itself was written in a 
secret code which could be deciphered only with numbers (O’Brien 2007). 
It was not only the mysticism behind the sacred numbers, such as 1 (singular form of 
God), 7 (creational days), 10 (Ten Commandments, known as Decalogue) or 666 (the 
number of the beast).  The importance of numbers and their interpretability lies even 
behind the structure of the Old Testament itself.  Nowadays it is composed out of 37 
books which according to the ancient rearrangements and grouping (done before Old 
Testament appeared as a compilation of books we know today) are in fact 22 books each 
of them representing one letter from the old Hebrew alphabet: 
Observe further that there are two and twenty books of the Old Testament, one for each 
letter of the Hebrew alphabet. (John of Damascus 7th century [2012], p. 89) 
                                                   
7
 “Surely there is a future, and your hope will not be cut off.” Bible, Proverbs 23:18. 
8
 “There is hope for your future.” Bible, Jeremiah 31:17. 
9
 “For I know the plans I have for you, declares the LORD, plans for welfare and not for evil, to give you a 
future and a hope” Bible, Jeremiah 29:11 which contradicts with Exodus 32:14: “So the LORD changed 
His mind about the harm which He said He would do to His people.” 
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Moreover, if looking at the whole Bible, the number of total books in New and Old 
Testament account for 49 which is demystified by numerologists as    .  According to 
Ernest L. Martin (2004) this combination represents completion and finality.  
Number 7 is also present in the very first business cycle which was introduced in the 
ancient Egypt section (Chapter II, 2.1).  Joseph deciphered Pharaoh’s dream as a 7-year 
economic cycle, while the following fiscal intervention saved Egypt from starvation. 
Dreams are one of the most frequent methods of prophesying in the Old Testament. 
Generally, there are two types of dreams: prophetic and symbolic (Bar 2001).  In a 
symbolic dream the visual is crucial – Pharaoh’s dream interpreted by Joseph is an 
example.  The visualization of the cows and deciphering the message is the main goal of 
the interpreter.  However, the prophetic dreams are more straight-forward: a clear, 
unambiguous verbal message is transmitted, as in the Solomon King dream, 
At Gibeon the Lord appeared to Solomon during the night in a dream […] “I will do what 
you have asked.  I will give you a wise and discerning heart, so that there will never have 
been anyone like you, nor will there ever be.” (1 Kings 3:5-12) 
Moreover, the importance of the dreams is revealed by the incapacity of distinguishing 
between it and reality in several stories in the Old Testament. As an example can serve 
the wrestle of Jacob with the angels that came to him in the night: 
And Jacob was left alone; and there wrestled a man with him until the breaking of the 
day.  And when he saw that he prevailed not against him, he touched the hollow of his 
thigh; and the hollow of Jacob's thigh was out of joint, as he wrestled with him.   And he 
said, Let me go, for the day breaketh. And he said, I will not let thee go, except thou bless 
me. (Genesis 32:24-26) 
The Old Testament made a clear differentiation concerning ownership and the right to 
access the information regarding the future.  In the current state of economics we cannot 
affirm that there is an owner per se of GDP (harvest), inflation (money), consumption 
(food) etc.  Only for conventionality we can think about the state, population or central 
monetary institutions, Central Banks.  However, in the Old Testament the ownership is 
clearly determined: God is presented as the ultimate owner of all created things.  This 
idea is essential in the Bible and is the basic idea to human stewardship (Graafland 2001).  
And it is not just the ownership alone, but also the right to explore. 
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The prophecy concerning the destruction of Babylon
10
 is a relevant example of the God’s 
ownership (Graafland 2001).  It implied that Babylon is meant to be destroyed because of 
its desire to get more than what it was given by default.  Besides, the way the prophecy is 
done reveals that Babylon was not just a city of the past, but represents a generalization 
of all ever-existing sinful cities which are predicted a sorrowful ending. 
2.2.1. Prophecies and Forecasting – What Makes the Difference? 
There are several arguments to explain the existing difference between the prophecies 
from the Old Testament and the concept of forecasting known by us today. 
The Message Generator and Intermediaries 
Unlike the economic forecasting performed by trained people - economists, the 
prophecies made in the Old Testament come directly from the God.  In all cases, 
predictions (named prophesies in the Bible) are made with God’ interference suggesting 
that there is no way in which a simple human being can know how the future is going to 
be like (again reverting to the idea of God’s ownership and his absolute power). 
However, in the Old Testament the place of economists is represented by intermediaries – 
prophets who had the role of deciphering and/or transmitting the message from the 
supreme power to ordinary people: 
I will raise up for them a prophet like you from among their brothers; I will put my words 
in his mouth, and he will tell them everything I command him. (Deuteronomy 18:18) 
Accordingly, the difference between prophecy and forecast is the presence of God in the 
first and his absence in the latter, given the existence of intermediaries in both cases.  
Robert Nelson is the one who developed the idea of economics and science as such being 
a new tool invented by the people to replace God (or gods) with a platonic imitation 
which would be as powerful as the God itself is.  We have replaced the God with 
economics and the prophets with economists. 
                                                   
10
 The full Babylon prophecy: Revelation 18:1-24, Old Testament. The destruction prophecy: “Then 
a strong angel took up a stone like a great millstone and threw it into the sea, saying, “So will Babylon, the 




[The] basic role of economists is to serve as the priesthood of a modern secular religion 
of economic progress that serves many of the same functions in contemporary society as 
earlier Christian and other religions did in their time. (Nelson 1991, p. XV) 
Moreover, economists not only replaced God, but remodeled the interpretation of the 
heaven as the ultimate goal by transforming it into a “heaven on earth, yet another 
economic road to salvation, yet another modern economic theology” (Nelson 1991).  But 
this replacement still keeps the forecasts distant in accuracy from prophecies. 
The Goodness of Fit: the difference between Truth and Probability 
The prophecies in the Old Testament have no scientific explanation and usually not even 
a non-scientific one; they are just to be believed.  And unlike economic forecasting where 
economists are making a tentative to predict the future, the prophecies represent an 
absolute fact excluding the doubts in its realization: 
Prophecy – a statement about what is going to happen in the future. (Oxford WordPower 
Dictionary 1988) 
[…] Prophecy, or the belief in any of the truths taught in Scripture. (Maimonides 1904, p. 
263)  
[…] the prophet is unconditionally superior […] He can know directly, without "premises 
and conclusions," what all other men can only know indirectly. (Strauss 1995, p. 85) 
Economists, instead, are considering probabilities and possibilities.  Additionally, when 
preparing a forecast, economists are mandatory relying on the lived experiences, while 
prophecies do not rely on any facts. These arguments highlight that the general difference 
between forecast versus prophesy is the reliability on some scientific versus non-
scientific arguments. 
What from the Old Testament lesson can be concluded is that the future can be exactly 
known only if there is supreme power interference.  The rationalization of the source or 
methodology of knowing the future is not explainable using scientific words, while the 
non-scientific interpretation is ignorable nowadays.  The forecasting methods that are 
currently being used by the economist differ significantly from the Old Testament ones in 
terms of goodness of fit, credibility, intermediaries and source (generator).  Dream – as a 
forecasting tool, remains in the Old Testament as powerful and as reliable as it was for 
ancient Egyptians.  The difference consists only in the persistently universal power of a 




2.3. Ancient Greece 
If for ancient Egyptians the time-interpretation was cyclical, while according to the Old 
Testament it was linear, than for the ancient Greece the universe and the time was a 
product of chaos which has irredeemably fallen out of the cyclical time in nature 
(Assmann 2005). 
Chaos implied that having an accurate model of a system wasn’t enough to predict its 
future evolution. […]  In a non-linear system, the strategy of breaking the whole down 
into its components would no longer apply because, like a haiku poem, the whole would 
be more than the sum of the parts. (Orrell 2007, p. 102) 
The role of its greatest minds: Thales (7
th
 Century B.C.), Pythagoras (6
th
 Century B.C.), 
Socrates, Xenophon, Plato (5
th
 Century B.C.), Aristotle (4
th
 century B.C.) – was to find a 
reasoning behind the world’s chaos and to explain it. 
It is widely recognized that ancient Greece put the most important building blocks to the 
modern mathematics as well as philosophy, such that the best summarized description for 
the ancient Greek brilliant minds would be: “developers of mathematical-philosophical 
truths” (Sedlacek 2011). 
However, before the development of philosophy and mathematics in the ancient Greece, 
the prediction of the future was done by one of the most well-known forecasters in the 
world history.  The Oracle of Delphi – which according to the legend was a cursed 
worship site for the Apollo god (Orrell 2007) – attracted the people from all over the 
world.  Cassandra and Pythia were two oracles, foretelling instruments that verbalized the 
predictions to the people. 
Although the Oracle of Delphi had an impressive reputation, the accuracy of predictions 
and their interpretability was less remarkable given also that the rituals were extremely 
costly.  The oracles never gave a yes-or-no answer and finally it lost its reputation and 
authority due to discrimination issues and unclear answers. 
2.3.1. Rejecting Traditional Thinking – Birth of Philosophy 
Even though for many ancient Greek intellectuals (Plato, Pythagoras, Thales) Egypt was 
the primary source of education and inspiration (James 2010), Greece alone had a much 
more profound footprint to leave on all the forthcoming generations. 
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The Oracle of Delphi was replaced by the Greek philosophers who problematized the 
issues of identity and self-awareness (Sorabji 2006).  While the Oracle of Delphi 
encouraged people to come and seek for an answer from the supreme powers, the Greek 
thinkers encouraged to look for the answers inside ourselves.  
Greeks were the first who dared to reject traditional doctrines of supernatural forces or 
superstitions and started to examine the world in its whole complexity: 
The Greek intellectuals adopted a totally new attitude toward nature.  This attitude was 
rational, critical, and secular.  Mythology was discarded as was the belief that the gods 
manipulate man and the physical world according to their whims. […]  In short, nature is 
rationally designed and that design […] can be apprehended by man’s mind.” (Kline 
1982, p. 10) 
But the influence of the Greek thinkers on the forthcoming societies did not consist only 
in rejection of the traditional thinking but also in delivering a new set of standard and 
beliefs to guide. As Bertrand Russell writes in Mysticism and Logic, the change through 
which Greek thinkers went through can be named as a philosophical illumination period. 
The first and most direct outcome of the moment of illumination is belief in the 
possibility of a way of knowledge which may be called revelation or insight or intuition, 
as contrasted with sense, reason, and analysis, which are regarded as blind guides leading 
to the morass of illusion.  Closely connected with this belief is the conception of a Reality 
behind the world of appearance and utterly different from it. (Russell 1918, p. 10) 
Losing faith and connection to supreme powers was additionally influenced by the wide 
multitude of gods that the ancient Greece encountered, as well as the indifference 
between worshiping one of them or another.  And unlike the Old Testament case where 
only one God was recognized, the Greeks had to deal with many of them: 
Christianity adds that God is love and a Father who cares for every one of his children. 
[…]  The issue between monotheism and polytheism, so vital to the Jew, seemed to the 
Greek a matter of small importance.  Even Plato, in a context where the very nature deity 
is in question, will speak of “God” or of “the gods” indifferently. (Cornford 1923, p. 10) 
The transition from a traditional religious society to an inside-oriented one was not an 
easy process.  As it is mentioned in one of Plato’s dialogues, Socrates testified that he 
was condemned to death because of insulting the sanctity of religion. 
He says that I am a maker of gods; and so he is prosecuting me, he says, for inventing 
new gods and for not believing in the old ones. (Plato 399BC [1963], p. 8) 
Philosophers originated their justification in the need of finding their own truth and their 
own explanation to the questions they were concerned about.  One of those questions was 
the power of the people over time.  As it was already mentioned, the interpretation of the 
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time in the ancient Greece was associated to chaos, however, the time flow was believed 
of having a non-chaotic character. 
Pythagoras thought that time moves in circles (Orrell 2007); however, the circles are 
never repeating themselves, but having a built-in component error so that it always 
deviates from expectation and thus we interpret it as a chaos.  Hesiod, an ancient Greek 
historian, determined that the time can be divided into five segments, “beginning with the 
golden age in a remote past, where human beings lived in peace with each other and in 
harmony with nature, down to the miserable contemporary age of iron, characterized by 
dispute and warfare” (Cullhed 2001).  Heraclitus, Greek thinker known for his insistence 
to believe that nothing repeats itself, believed, as Bertrand Russell notes (1918), in 
universal flux: “time builds and destroys all things.” 
On the other side, Plato considered that there is nothing random and everything can be 
known in advance if we would learn to understand the chaos (Orrell 2007), since time 
follows a logical path. 
According to Plato, the tracks of truth […] of this world lie somewhere deep within us, 
where they are written even before we are born. If we were to search for them, it would 
suffice to turn to our own interiors. Searching for truth in outside world is misleading and 
distracting, because it leads us to a path of following and examining shadows. (Sedlacek 
2011, p. 105-106)  
The main achievement of Greek philosophers was inspiring human brains to ask, think 
and look for answers.  But the method of actually thinking and formulating the questions 
and answers was also a new one.  Ancient Greeks injected into the all forthcoming 
generations the addiction to numbers.   
2.3.2. Mathematics and Quantification: Pythagorean Language 
“All is number.” 
(The Pythagorean School dictum) 
The Pythagorean School brought an enormous contribution to nowadays sciences given 
that most of them are based on mathematics. 
Pythagoras himself was said to be born as a prediction of the Oracles (Orrell 2007).  He 
believed that numbers represent not only quantity, but also quality by which he developed 
the numerical mysticism (Sedlacek 2011).  According to Pythagoras, the highest form of 
prediction was divination through numbers: he didn’t just predict the future using 
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numerical tools; “he also helped define it” (Orrell 2007).  The definition of mathematics 
was ingeniously done through creating a new language which was the mathematics itself.  
This language helped to copy the reality and transpose it into quantifiable expressions or, 
as Wittgenstein formulates it, 
 […] Generality which we need in mathematics is not the accidental one.  The 
propositions of logic are tautologies.  The propositions of logic therefore say nothing. 
(They are the analytical propositions.) (Wittgenstein 1922, p. 76-77) 
‘Mathematical certainty’ is not a philosophical concept. […]  Certainty is […] language-
game. (Wittgenstein 1958, p. 224) 
The mathematics that Pythagoras developed was interpreted as a separate language which 
was both universal and mandatory provable.  Thus, the need to attest a statement and the 
universal applicability of the numbers and quantification became a defining threat of the 
math-language. 
(i) The need of proof.  Pythagoras himself brought to mathematics more than the 
Pythagorean Theorem.  He is considered to be the first important explorer of 
mathematical figures, mathematical principles and the idea of proof. 
[…] all proof and all persuasion is part of science. (Fairbanks 1898, p. 145) 
Pythagoras considered that proof is an inseparable tool of showing the 
truthfulness, while he himself did not consider appropriate to give 
explanations to his own calculations.  Some of his theorems were taken as a 
rule by his students and none had enough courage to ask for a proof unless it 
was just shown (Orrell 2007). 
(ii) The quantification of everything.  For Pythagoras all things were 
measurable and all could be represented by a geometrical figure, thus numbers 
and mathematics became an universal tool to understand the world: 
Pythagoras said that time is the sphere of what surrounds the world. […]  The universe is 
made from five solid figures, which are called also mathematical; of these he says that 
earth has arisen from the cube, fire from the pyramid, air from the octahedron, and water 
from the icosahedron, and the sphere of the all from the dodecahedron. […]  The sun is 
spherical.” (Fairbanks 1898, p. 146-147) 
Moreover, each of these figures had an argumentative support behind such 
that, for example, the association of the air with an octahedron could be 
extended to the following: 
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Air is composed of forty-eight triangles, surrounded by eight equilaterals. And it is 
compared to the octahedron, which is surrounded by eight equilateral triangles, each of 
which is separated into six right-angled triangles so as to become forty-eight in all. 
(Fairbanks 1898, p. 155) 
Even though the inspiration of Greek thinkers is proved to have been inspired from 
Egyptians, the Greeks did an impressive step forward and provided the forthcoming 
generations with a strong building block for the development of the mathematical-
philosophical truths.  But the greatest success that Greeks achieved was the 
encouragement of thinking, expression and proving.  They were the first to require 
justifications and logical support, and denied traditional superficial attitude. Starting with 
ancient Greece and till nowadays people are in search of their testable truths. 
2.4. Concluding: What is Old and What is New? 
There are thousands of years that trace a line between now and the ancient societies 
discussed previously.  The evolution of the civilizations does not mandatory imply that 
the development progresses in all directions.  Some methods of forecasting the future 
progressed; others got forgotten or disregarded. 
The current ignorance of non-scientific methods of foreseeing the future explains why the 
range of methodological tools used for forecasting in ancient times was much wider than 
the focus on the empirical judgment alone on which we fully rely nowadays. 
Some of those forgotten methods are: dreams, magic, religion, belief.  Dreams were one 
of the most important and credible forecasting methods for ancient Egyptians and for 
Jews.  Magic was a field opened only to authoritative people in Egypt, while religion and 
belief were the drivers in the Old Testament.  Ancient Greece had a more transitory place 
between ancient societies and modern world.  And as it will be further discussed, many 
current forecasting methodologies were born and developed by Greek thinkers. 
The forecasting can be generally divided into two approaches: the qualitative and the 
quantitative ones.  While the current qualitative methods refer to informed opinion, 
judgment, market research and historical life-cycle, the quantitative methods refer to 
prediction of the quantifiable variables based on some past available data. 
The field in which we advanced today compared to the ancient civilizations is 
sophisticated quantitative methods.  The addiction for numbers that Greeks gave birth to 
is the main driver of the current forecasting field, the vast majority of economic 
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forecasting methodologies relying on numerical methods while none of them advancing 
to persistently give an accurate prediction. 
Bryan and Molloy (2007) found that there is very little evidence that any forecaster from 
1983 till 2007 consistently predicted better than the median forecast and, further, 
forecasters who gave better than-average predictions in one year are unable to sustain 
their performance — at least no more than random chance would suggest.  Veress (2012) 
also investigated the quality of forecasts.  The analysis compared the performance of 
different groups including governmental employees, academicians and bankers. 
According to the results, none of these three groups is able to achieve a better 
performance than the naïve forecasters. 
Right after quantification has to be mentioned the nowadays requirement for proofs.  For 
ancient Egyptian, for the Greek Oracle of Delphi, as well as for the Jews, the proofs of a 
forecast were never required.  The credibility was absolute, as well as the power of the 
forecasters over the normal people (being it God for Jews, oracles for Greeks or Pharaoh 
and priests for Egyptians).  As Karl Popper mentioned referring to the developing 
scientific theory: 
Now I hold that scientific theories are never fully justifiable or verifiable, but that they 
are nevertheless testable. I shall therefore say that the objectivity of scientific statements 
lies in the fact that they can be inter-subjectively tested. (Popper 1959, p. 22) 
The requirement for testing the theories has its roots in ancient Greece who developed 
through the Pythagorean School the idea that believable theories are those theories that 
have been proved.  
Another new tool used by economists to predict the future is conventionalism (Chapter 
III, 3.4.) and the full reliability of our complex world on some simplified, minimalistic 
assumptions such as ceteris paribus
11
, or simplifications that rule out the structural 
changes: constant, time-invariant data generation processes, stationarity, model 
uniqueness (Clements and Hendry 2008).  While nowadays economics is ruling out 
certain details considered irrelevant, the ancient forecasts were actually based on 
scientifically ignorable facts. 
                                                   
11
 “Questions concerning ceteris paribus clauses are closely related to questions concerning simplifications 
and idealizations, since one way to simplify is to suppose that the various disturbing causes or interferences 
are inactive and to explore the consequences of some small number of causal factors.” Hausman, 
Philosophy and Economics, 87. 
21 
 
The cyclicality is another feature that has its roots in ancient times which has grown 
today into a separate branch of economics named business cycle theory.  Referring to 
cyclicality in 1930s John Kenneth Galbraith writes in The Affluent Society, 
At the beginning of the decade, it was almost uniformly assumed that cycle fluctuations 
[…] are inevitable. […]  By the end of the decade, under the combined influence of 
Keynes and the sanguine and experimental mood generated by New Deal, there was a 
widespread belief that depressions could be at least partially prevented.  The notion that 
they must be allowed to run their course was virtually extinct. (Galbraith 1960, p. 88) 
The very first documented business cycle, discussed already, introduced the 7-year fiscal 
cycle derived from Pharaoh’s dream in ancient Egypt which is presented in the Old 
Testament.  The solution that was proposed to the forthcoming cycles was to save the 
surplus of harvest in the first 7 years of abundance and consume the savings in the 
following 7 years of starvation.  Interestingly, the modern economics arrived to this fiscal 
intervention logic only thousands of years later, as Galbraith writes: in the late 1930s’. 
Nowadays it was rediscovered and developed into a separate widely-analyzed theory 
which finds strong evidences supporting the correlation between fiscal cycles and output 
cycles (Benetrix and Lane 2011). 
To conclude, undoubtedly the influence of the ancient societies on the modern science is 
significant and impossible to ignore.  The need and desire to predict the future is 
observable at any stage of the human history, but the methods in which people tried to 
foresee it – changed.  The modern forecasting tools have a considerable influence of the 
ancient Greek thinkers, while most of the tools to forecast the future used in ancient 
Egypt and described in the Old Testament are ignored. The current state of economic 
forecasting relies fully on scientific methods, while the non-scientific ones (dreams, 










III. DETERMINANT BIASES IN ECONOMIC FORECASTING 
 
3.1. Economics versus Physics 
“Economics makes a clear effort to get as 
close as it can to physics, which is a natural 
science about “dead” objects; one which is 
probably closest to predicting the future 
events.” 
(Tomas Sedlacek) 
While the trajectory of an arrow in physics can be exactly determined knowing certain 
variables, we can hardly determine the trajectory of economics using mathematical 
models.  Models are, in fact, a graphical representation of reality developed under the 
pretense that they are more explicit and demonstrative than reality itself.  The inaccuracy 
in representation and the impossibility of capturing an image is what makes economics 
different as compared to physics, harder to understand and predict.  Still, seeking that 
universality of economic theorems can be stimulating in the same fashion that David 
Orrell (2010) described: 
The beauty of the Pythagorean theorem […] is not that it applies to some right-angled 
triangles or most right-angled triangles, but to all right-angled triangles. (Orrell 2010, p. 
48) 
The effort for improving accuracy – this is what makes economics closer to physics, 
seeking its universality. Regarding the incompleteness of economics, Dr. Subbarao 
expressed it in an interesting way: 
There is a joke that if something works in practice, economists run to see if it works in 
theory. (Subbarao 2010, p. 6) 
The summarized idea of this is that economics cannot be framed by theory.  Focusing on 
theory only is misleading since not everything can be represented by equations or can be 
fitted by models.  And the effort to provide all theories with empirical support is not 
exactly what economics as a science should do. 
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Rather than attempt to imitate the hard sciences, social scientists would be better off 
doing what they do best: thinking deeply about what prompts human beings to behave the 
way they do. (Clarke and Primo 2012, NY Times article) 
Economics doesn’t work with strictly constant and touchable objects and this is why the 
theoretical economics has the abstraction and the reality confronted in assumptions: 
A typical statement in economic ‘theory’ is, ‘if information is symmetric, an equilibrium 
of the game exists’ or, ‘if people are rational in their expectations in the following sense, 
buzz, buzz, buzz, then there exists an equilibrium of the economy in which government 
policy is useless’… Okay, now imagine an alternative set of assumptions… There’s 
nothing deep or surprising about this: changing your assumptions changes your 
conclusions… And on and on and on and on, until the economists get tired and go 
home… I have expressed admiration for pure mathematics and for Mozart’s concertos. 
Fine. But economics is supposed to be an inquiry into the world, not pure thinking. 
(McCloskey 2002, p. 43-44) 
The real economy is enriched with the characteristic of being risky, - an axiom which is 
“the cliché of economic life”12.  However, it is also uncertain which differs from riskiness 
not only in terms of independency from our beliefs and knowledge, as Keynes explained 
in A Treatise on Probability (1921), but also the difference consists in the inability of 
uncertainty measurement with probability dimensions. 
The elimination of this insecurity would imply a finished economic activity since, for 
example, there would be no reason in the existence of the stock markets if there would be 
no risk in them, or there would be no winners in a horse racing if all knew the winning 
horse a priori.  This logic is applicable to the human life also: “any organism that is too 
predictable in its behavior will die” (Orrell 2007, p. 335).  And as long as economics is 
alive, it should be unpredictable and far enough from physics. 
3.2. Human Behavior Biases 
Not even the highest IQ entities have the capacity to foresee the future, as Whitehead 
(1978) writes: “it is as true to say that God creates the World, as that the World creates 
God”.  People are those who fear the instability and emotional distress from 
unanticipations.  But the complexity of predicting the future is on an equal measure 
determined by the unpredictability of human behaviour itself – which started to be 
regarded in the last period as an important bias when it comes to the decision-making 
process. 
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 “Nothing is more completely accepted in the conventional wisdom than the cliché that economic life is 
endlessly and inherently uncertain.” Galbraith, The Affluent Society, 93. 
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The incapacity to controlling and modeling it served as one of the motives of the 
centrally-planned economy collapse, mainly referring to the Soviet Union example 
(Sedlacek 2011).  Modeling human behaviour would mean designing and controlling 
those 65000 thoughts per day – an approximated number provided by scientists (Chopra 
1990).  Although the majority of these thoughts are repeated on a daily basis, each of 
them has an influential power on the further decisions and, most complicated 
mathematically, they influence each other. 
But not only these subjective and individualistic decisions and thoughts are 
uncontrollable and unpredictable.  The identity concept is another explanation developed 
by Akerlof & Kranton (2000) as determining a person’s sense of self.  One of the main 
explanations given by the identity concept is the fact that people are consciously subject 
to choices which can be detrimental to themselves and which affect economic outcomes.  
Moreover, the identity concept admits that people can harm themselves intentionally to 
bolster a sense of self or to salve a diminished self-image (Akerlof & Kranton 2000, p. 
718) – which is catalogued by Sam Harris as a paradox of human life: 
Among the many paradoxes of human life, this is perhaps the most peculiar and 
consequential: we often behave in ways that are guaranteed to make us unhappy. Many of 
us spend our lives marching with open eyes toward remorse, regret, guilt, and 
disappointment. (Harris 2000, p. 4) 
A similar idea was developed also by Alchian in 1950. He concluded that human 
behaviour is unpredictable even if a best-response action is known: 
Uncertainty arises from at least two sources: imperfect foresight and human inability to 
solve complex problems containing a host of variables even when an optimum is 
definable. (Alchian 1950, p. 212) 
Further two aspects of the human behaviour bias will be discussed: the bounded 
rationality sustained also by the this-time-is-different syndrome, and the animal spirit bias 
in parallel with the unbounded emotionality. 
3.2.1. This-time-is-different Syndrome and Bounded Rationality 
The conventionality of assuming all individuals having identical preferences and, thus, 
taking identical decisions is widely disapproved and used only in some old models.  
People are different; they do have different utility functions and different preferences – 
not always rational and not always the expected ones.  Dan Ariely argues that our 
irrationality is, in fact, predictable since it is not unique, but systematic: 
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[…] these irrational behaviors of ours are neither random nor senseless. They are 
systematic, and since we repeat them again and again, predictable. (Ariely 2008, p. XX) 
The theory of rationality (which, according to Spohn (2002), has grown as a separate 
science on its own) assumes that people learn from past mistakes and are able to apply all 
their abilities in the further decisions, actions knowing that a optimal decision-making 
requires a prediction of future tastes (Lowenstein et al. 2003). 
Nevertheless, the application of the knowledge from past experience in the future 
decision-making processes is not an easy tool to manage since the distinction between the 
past experiences and the future ones is, as Adam Smith writes in The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, 
[…] the great source of both the misery and disorders of human life. (Smith 1853, p. 131) 
An explanation to the unpredictability problem is the bounded rationality of people who 
are unable to learn from past mistakes and they let the this-time-is-different syndrome to 
manifest: 
The essence of the this-time-is-different syndrome is simple.  It is rooted in the firmly 
held belief that financial crises are things that happen to other people in other countries at 
other times; crises do not happen to us, here and now.  We are doing things better, we are 
smarter, we have learnt from past mistakes.  [However] the old rules of valuation no 
longer apply. (Reinhart & Rogoff 2009, p. 15) 
Even thought the this-time-is-different syndrome explains that learning from past 
experiences is important, relying on the past only to predict the future can also be 
erroneous.  Experimentally it has been shown that people actually are not able to 
distinguish between evaluation (of the past) and prediction (of the future) when they are 
asked to do so. In both cases they rely on the past experience and the evaluation is equal 
to the prediction.  Such that, as Tversky & Kahneman (1974) argue, if a company’s profit 
has to be evaluated or predicted, the profit amount will be identical for both evaluators 
and predictors. 
However, there is some reasonableness behind people’s bounded rationality in time.  
Firstly, we do not have yet sufficient “hardware” power to collect and process all the 
information (but we will be able to do that one day
13
).  Secondly, not all information is 
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 “The theories will treat the economy not as an inert machine, but as a kind of living organism. The 
models and techniques will resemble those developed for life sciences like systems biology or ecology or 
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worth processing. And the partial ignorance in general is a method to protect our brains 
from trash info
14
.  The bounded rationality can be interpreted as a protective mechanism 
periodically failing by disregarding relevant information.  This selection and/or ignorance 
can be associated with the omitted variable bias in econometrics – without it the model 
explains less but how to know which variable exactly is omitted. 
Anthony Downs (1957) explained this informational selection using the citizens versus 
political parties’ example where none knows everything about the other but decisions 
have to be taken: citizens have to choose a party to vote for; politicians have to decide on 
their priorities in policy-making.  Eventually, Downs A. (1957) introduced the rational 
ignorance explaining it as a rational response to the information excess – the processing 
costs of which can exceed the benefits. 
So far, rational ignorance is an explanation to bounded rationality: it is too expensive to 
know everything.  Perhaps, it can also explain the this-time-is-different syndrome where 
the sequential logic is simple: people face an informational selection at an inter-temporal 
level and ignore the past facts which they believe are ignorable in present.  But from the 
other side, the memory itself is limited and according to the availability heuristic15 the 
decisions that people are making are based on the memorable experiences only. 
To the question why people don’t learn from their experience, Adam Smith gives his 
answer specifying that people are afraid of analyzing their past mistakes and recognizing 
them
16
.  The self-deceit is the best summarizing word in this sense: we know about our 
misconceptions, but we don’t like recognizing them. 
                                                                                                                                                       
medicine. Instead of seeing the economy as a self-contained, closed box, the theories will include 
interactions.” Orrell, Economyths. Then Ways That Economics Gets it Wrong, 254-255 
14
 “Every society must be protected from a too facile flow of thought. In the field of social comment, a 
great stream of information novelties, if all were taken seriously, would be disastrous.” Galbraith, The 
Affluent Society, 16. 
15
 “There are situations in which people assess the frequency of a class or the probability of an event by the 
ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to mind. […] This judgmental heuristic is called 
availability. Availability is a useful clue for assessing frequency or probability, because instances of large 
classes are usually recalled better and faster than instances of less frequent classes. […] Consequently, the 
reliance on availability leads to predictable biases.” Tversky, Kahneman, Judgments under uncertainty: 
Heuristics and biases, 1127. 
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 “It is so disagreeable to think ill of ourselves, that we often purposely turn away our view from those 




Bounded rationality is, however, not only a problem, but also an argument to explain 
failures.  And there are several (theoretical) explanations to support this intuition. 
One of these explanations, developed by Rabin & Schrag (1999), is the evidence of 
confirmatory bias which states that once there is a hypothesis to test, the attention will be 
paid mostly to those evidences that support it, while those contradicting will be ignored.  
The disconfirmation itself is already a bounded rationality evidence of an active 
irrational ignorance: reducing the caution, undermining the other experiences, 
highlighting the self-deceit. 
Another explanation of bounded rationality is the hindsight bias which is one’s tendency, 
after learning about the actual outcome of a situation or the correct answer to a question, 
to distort a previous judgment – the prediction – in the direction of this new information 
(Werthf et al. 2002).  The hindsight bias is a re-interpretation of the outcome 
downgrading the surprise element and adopting of an “I knew it all along” attitude 
(Mazursky & Ofir 1990).  Hindsight bias is an attempt to reject any bounded rationality 
prints.  In this sense the old Marxian definition of ideology: “They do not know it, but 
they are doing it” can be reinterpreted according to Jacques Lacan (1997): “I know it very 
well, but still, I do it.” 
3.2.2. Animal Spirit Bias and Unbounded Emotionality 
As well as bounded rationality, the animal spirit is an involuntary and, additionally, 
hardly manageable bias. 
[…] It seems to mean that which motivates us, animates us, somewhat irrationally; that 
which gives us our aims, hopes, purposes, dreams.  It is unpredictable and does not easily 
lend itself to mathematical analysis. (Sedlacek 2011, p. 276) 
The central motivation which drives the humanity, as Adam Smith wrote in The Theory 
of Moral Sentiments, is not hidden in egoism as such, but in craving for social admiration 
and gratitude.  And since these are central drivers which we have the strongest desire for, 
we end up with sentiments, actions and passions which are over our own control and 
cold-thinking: we feel like animals “tormented with all the agonies of doubt and 
uncertainty” (Smith 1853, p.142). 
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But while the bounded rationality and the this-time-is-different syndrome refer to a 
limited capacity to processing past, present and future events, the animal spirit bias 
manifests in a continuum present time.  
Most animals seem to focus almost entirely on reacting to current stimuli, as opposed to 
remembering the past or anticipating the future.  We humans are proud that we attend 
more to the past and future, but perhaps this is still harder than we let on, and we flatter 
ourselves by thinking we attend more than we do. (Hanson 2011, Online Article on Cato) 
Our spontaneity is our animal spirit, and that is a rational explanation why forecasting 
problems rely on expressions which target animals: black swan, butterfly effect, the well-
known trends on the financial markets: bear and bull, or the monetary policy 
phenomenon of hawk and dove. 
The power of our sentiments, beliefs, and emotions is uncontrollably over the power of 
classical rules, judgments and even rationality.  And the uncontrollability of this power 
gives us an animal spirit which takes the decisions on our behalf.  The main reasoning 
behind the manifest of such a bias, according to Martin et al. (1998), is people’s inability 
to bound emotions – which increased into a separate theory: bounded emotionality 
according to which people have to learn to limit their emotiveness, at least in some cases, 
in order to be considered adapted humans.  The most relevant example in this sense is 
people’s behaviour at work which has to be more reserved and calculated, less eccentric 
and wild.  Thus, while bounded rationality is non-voluntary, the emotionality is to be 
bounded intentionally.   
3.3. Types of Scientific Predictions 
The punishment which people can get from trying to discover the future cannot be worse 
than unpredicted events to occur.  The justification for a misleading forecast can rely on 
any of the described biases, in the economists’ limited professionalism, in the models 
bounded capacity.  Accurate or ambiguous, forecasting is 
[…] the oldest dream of humanity, the dream to know what the future has in store for us, 
and to profit from such knowledge. (Popper 1959, p. 4) 
If it is our oldest dream, we cannot argue about its morality per se, it is just something in 
us, our defining treat.  But is it all forecastable? 
Karl Popper makes a clear line in this sense: not everything is predictable, and scientists 
should learn to distinguish between the conditional and unconditional forecasting. 
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3.3.1. Conditional Forecasting 
The conditional scientific prediction, according to Popper (1959), is a deductable 
prediction and can be regarded as a response to certain excitations (if X happens, Y will 
happen), while the unconditional one is just an a priori post-factum (Y will happen).  The 
incapacity of people to distinguish between these two types of forecasting is an 
explanation to predictions’ accuracy failures.   
The conditional forecasting is presented by Karl Popper as a scientific prediction or a 
prediction which is affordable to the scientists.  However, not even the conditional 
predictions are universally understandable since they have time constraints: 
[…] long term prophecies can be derived from scientific conditional predictions only if 
they apply to systems which can be described as well isolated, stationary, and recurrent. 
(Popper 1959, p. 5) 
Even though the modern times are neither stationary, nor isolated, Karl Marx believed 
that it is only a stationary and closed society (with no foreign trade
17
) the one universally 
and conditionally predictable.  
In Marxian interpretation the unconditional events (e.g. crises) appear only as a 
disturbance to the economic system artificially excited by the wealthiest class in the 
society (bourgeois).
18
  Galbraith also mentions in The Affluent Society that for Marx, 
depressions are a devastating fact of capitalist life which aims the destruction of the 
whole system – where destruction means centrally uncontrollable or, as translated into 
economic terms: high volatility systems. 
Conditional forecasting, thus, is an affordable forecasting given specific conditions.  
However, economics is far from being perfectly conditional. 
3.3.2. Unconditional Forecasting 
As already mentioned, the unconditional forecasting is a future fact which cannot be 
predicted.  It is a historical prophecy (Popper, 1959) which scientists try to predict and 
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 “What he [Marx] had hitherto deduced […] that the world trade crisis of 1847 had been the true mother 
of the February and March revolutions.” Engels, Introduction to Karl Marx’s. The Class Struggles in 
France 1848 to 1850, 2. 
18
 “Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting 
uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones.” Marx, Manifesto of The 
Communist Party, 16. 
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fail to differentiate from a scientific prediction. Scientific forecasting requires scientific 
arguments.  Unconditional forecasting can rely only on non-scientific arguments such as 
intuition, dreams, premonition etc. – transforming the unconditional forecasting into 
unconditional prophecy which is scientifically insignificant.  However, even the 
assumptions on which the econometric models are based are far from being strongly 
scientific, credible and undeniable. The unconditional forecasting does not rely 
practically on any assumptions and its prediction can be considered as universal ones, 
applying to all models.  For example: 
[…] if the Fed’s staff would compute an unconditional best forecast for the federal funds 
rate it might as well dominate the model forecasts for all horizons. (Wolters 2011, p. 19) 
From the technical point of view, the difference between the conditional and 
unconditional forecasting models is that the first ones use structural models, while the 
former – the non-structural models which 
[…] attempt to exploit the reduced-form correlations, with little reliance on economic 
theory. Structural models, in contrast, view and interpret economic data through the lens 
of a particular economic theory. (Diebold 1998, p. 175) 
The tradeoff between conditional and unconditional forecasting becomes clear enough.  
The conditional one limits you to tight boundaries but gives you a plausible outcome; 
while the unconditional forecasting has no limits and has perfect answers which just are 
neither definable, nor scientifically understandable. 
3.4. Conventionalism and Statistical Significance 
 “In 1940s and 1950s, economists sought 
philosophical justification for their practice 
of model and measure.  Nowadays, the focus 
is on conventionalism.” (Pette Boettke) 
Statistics is a conventional science working in certain frames, methodologies, based on 
certain assumptions.  If the assumption is wrong, the whole mechanism is useless 
regardless of the result significance.  However, neither statistics, nor mathematics is a sin 
of economics – both are virtues, according to McCloskey (2002). 
The conventionalism roots state that there is no science which is unambiguously 
determined by experience only, economics is no exception.  Therefore, scientists have to 
choose among a wide range of theories and methodologies.  Conventionalism states that 
the simplest one will be chosen.  The simplest one means, as Popper (1959) classifies it, 
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something closer to partly practical, closer to partly true.  Accordingly, if economics is a 
conventional science, then it doesn’t incorporate in itself the entire information about the 
economic processes but chooses the simplest one by quantifying them (expressing 
numerically). 
Statistical significance comes next to help in falsification, which is considered as a 
separate twentieth-century story, according to Blaug writings (1997).  The reason why 
statistical significance is directly linked to falsification is because it is a qualitative 
measure of probability about the data assuming the truth of a singular hypothesis 
(McCloskey 2002), such that all others are rejected.  
As R. Fisher wrote in his famous article introducing the statistical significance, Statistical 
Methods for Research Workers (1925): 
[…] the science of statistics is essentially a branch of Applied Mathematics and may be 
regarded as mathematics applied to observational data. (Fisher 1925, p. 3) 
However, by the virtue of its creation, economic thought has to be much more expended 
that some applied mathematics alone. Fisher (1956) himself pointed, after introducing the 
statistical significance the following: 
However, the calculation [of the statistical significance] is absurdly academic, for in fact 
no scientific worker has a fixed level of significance at which from year to year, and in all 
circumstances, he rejects hypotheses; he rather gives his mind to each particular case in 
the light of his evidence and his ideas. (Fisher 1956, p. 7) 
And even tough Fisher himself pointed one of the main weaknesses of the overemphasis 
and non-universality of the statistical significance he made a mistake which is not 
sufficiently covered not even today.  It concerns mainly that, as Curran-Everett stated 
(2009), Fisher defined a null hypothesis but no alternative hypothesis and considered only 
this hypothesis relevant, ignoring that there can be other extended, mixed ones: 
Every experiment may be said to exist only in order to give the facts a chance of 
disapproving the null hypothesis. (Fisher 1937, p. 17) 
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To this has to be added that when we make an inference about a null hypothesis, we can 
make a mistake by rejecting a true hypothesis or failing to reject a false hypothesis both 
involving an error
19
.  Milton Friedman explains that, 
[…] the validity of a hypothesis […] is not by itself a sufficient criterion for choosing 
among alternative hypotheses. Observed facts are necessarily finite in number; possible 
hypotheses, infinite. (Friedman 1966, p. 9) 
But either rejected or not what the significance test reveals is whether there is anything 
non-random that describes the analyzed regression and which is important.  The answer 
can be either yes-or-no, while science, according to Currant-Everett (2009), is less yes-or-
no and more how-much.  Or, as Galbraith (1960) expressed it: “A possibility of a trouble 
is not a prediction of a trouble”. 
In this way we risk to exclude the relevancy out of the model by excluding random 
events.  However, conventionality claims that this simplification is sufficient enough. 
What could be a strong excuse for the social sciences to explain the models’ inaccuracy is 
to stick to the Friedman’s (1966) instrumentalism theory.  Accordingly, positive 
economics is concerned with the development of a theory of hypothesis which would 
yield valid and meaningful predictions.  And, by definition, positive economics should 
provide generalizations, while the assumptions on which the positive economic theories 
are based are not realistic and cannot be and, thus, the results are not defined by 
descriptive accuracy but analytical relevancy. 
Complete "realism" is clearly unattainable, and the question whether a theory is realistic 
"enough" can be settled only by seeing whether it yields predictions that are good enough 
for the purpose in hand or that are better than predictions from alternative theories. 
(Friedman 1966, p. 41) 
3.5. Nowcasting 
Economic prediction does not mean solely prediction of the future.  The nowcasting is a 
new economic methodology, a set of standard measures to assess the present state of the 
economy.  Nowcasts represent the current-quarter forecasts, mostly used by monetary 
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 “There is a profound asymmetry between conclusions issuing from rejecting the null hypothesis on the 
one hand, and failing to reject it on the other. Somewhat ironically, the main reason for this asymmetry is 
that, as noted, accepting the null hypothesis is almost always a guaranteed error.” Loftus, On the Tyranny of 
Hypothesis Testing in the Social Science, 104. 
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institutions, according to which nowcasting represents the prediction of the present, the 
very near future and the very recent past (Banbura et al. 2010). 
Unlike, for example, weather where forecasters know perfectly what was the weather 
yesterday and what weather is exactly at this moment, economics faces a time-struggle 
with data collection and even forecasting the very recent past and present is a dilemma.  
The methodological tool which stays at the bottom of nowcasting procedure was 
developed by Giaconne et al. (2008) and it mainly represents a non-standard tool that 
exploits the information in a large number of monthly variables, released in an 
asynchronous way.  The nowcasts, thus, are being updated each time when new 
information is introduced into the dataset which becomes progressively larger in time.  
The idea of this all-info-inclusiveness methodology is in contrast with the 
conventionalism idea since it captures all information available on the market.  And even 
though the nowcasts are not perfectly accurate, they are evaluated as being more accurate 
than the low-information models. 
The basic idea of the nowcasting methodology can be summarized as the more we know – 
the more we know, where, as its authors, Giaconne et al. (2008), suggest, the timing of 
releases is a key determinant of the size of the release’s marginal predictive power.  
Along with nowcasting, the issues related to data revisions have to be also mentioned.  
Most economic variables with few exceptions (e.g. interest rates, exchange rates, 
commodity prices and survey of forecasts20) are systematically revised.  This is either 
related to data collection issues, certain post adjustments or redefinitions. Either way, at 
least for the 3 most important economic variables: GDP, unemployment rate and CPI, the 
Federal Reserve is revising the data even 5 years after the initial release (Table 3.1.). 
This leads to a rational conclusion that even in a 4-year old data might be hidden an error 
due to methodological and practical inability to measure instantaneously the economy.  
The revision itself tends to improve the quality of data, however, adding more uncertainty 
into it.  And the main implication, according to Cardoso & Duarte (2009), is not even the 
inaccuracy in the performed economic analysis based on inaccurate data, but the policy 
implications which may alter current assessments. 
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 Cardoso & Duarte, Data revisions, 2 
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Table 3.1: Timing and Reasons for Data Revisions 
Data Series 
(Reporting Agency) 
Timing of Revisions Reason for Revisions 
 
National Income and Product 
Accounts Data – includes real 
GDP and the GDP price index 
(Bureau of Economic Analysis) 
1 month after initial release More complete information 
2 months after initial release More complete information 
Every July the prior 3 years of 
data are revised 
Better, less timely information 
becomes available 
All historical data are revised 
every 5 years or so (benchmark 
revisions) 
New source data, possible 
changes in definitions of 




(Bureau of Labor Statistics) 
Occasional With changes in census 
population (usually, but not 
always, associated with the 
decennial census) 
For 5 years after initial release Seasonal adjustment factors are 
revised with the availability of 
additional data 
 
Consumer Price Index 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics) 
Occasional To correct reporting errors or 
software errors 
For 5 years after initial release Seasonal adjustment factors are 
revised with the availability of 
additional data 
Source: Kozinski, 2004 
The biggest issue concerning data revisions is not caused by the revisions existence 
themselves, but by the unpredictability of the adjustments which strongly rely on news 
updates.  Moreover, revisions are not even persistent and are labeled as “badly-behaved” 
information (Cardoso & Duarte 2009), with a non-zero mean. 
The lesson to be learnt from nowcasting, thus, is the fact that not only the far future is 
unknown to the economists but also the relatively recent past. And, probably, predicting 






IV. EVALUATING FORECASTING PERFORMANCE DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
One of the main differences which are implied when tracing a line between developed 
and developing countries is institutional performance
21
.  However, the performance of 
those institutions is strongly influenced and dependant on the credibility and correctitude 
of the available data.  Policy makers are daily using in their work forecasts on which they 
base they decisions.  Quite simply, good forecasts lead to good decisions (Diebold & 
Lopez 1996).  Or, the value of the forecasts made can be best understood in the relation to 
the decisions guided by the respective forecasts (Elliott & Timmermann 2008). 
In this part of the thesis, an analysis of the accuracy of the forecasts performed by the 
International Monetary Fund will be done.  Firstly, the IMF as a data provider will be 
introduced and its credibility in this sense will be discussed.  Secondly, the evaluation of 
the forecasting performance of the IMF on the developed versus developing countries 
will be done in order to test whether the precision of forecasts is higher for the rich 
countries as compared to the least developed ones. 
4.1. International Monetary Fund as a Data Provider 
IMF appears as one of the most credible international institutions.  This is sustained by 
the increased popularity of the “precautionary programs”, as well as the built-in image of 
the organization as an aid agent with well-structured regulatory requirements and as a 
purveyor of policy advice (Bordo & James 2000). 
The IMF credibility is primarily enforced by the strong conditionality which is defined as 
a tool by which a country is made to follow specific policies or to undertake certain 
reforms that it would probably not have undertaken otherwise, in exchange for support 
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 “While the definitions of “institutions” may vary across studies, the results are consistent and strong: 
institutions explain economically and statistically significant differences in per capita incomes across 
countries.” Eicher & Leukert, Institutions and Economic Performance, 7. 
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(Buira 2002).  Secondly, the credibility is enforced by the IMF programs contribution to 
economic development in the countries that were subject to respective programs which is 
widely supported and analyzed (Haque & Khan 1988; Krueger 1998; Przeworski & 
Vreeland 2000; Shirai 2003; Dreher & Walter 2008; etc.) 
As it is argued, one of the IMF’s most useful functions to the debate about policy 
coordination is through the provision of data and forecasts (Bordo & James 2000).  
Nowadays the World Economic Outlook is one of the most widely accessed databases. 
There are at least two reasons behind the popularity of the IMF databases: 
1. Availability of an aggregate cross-country dataset; 
2. High data credibility given that IMF imposes penalties on the local governments 
for the supply of the misleading data. 
Taking these into account, IMF seems one of the most reliable and credible data sources 
for the comparison of the forecasting performance between developed and developing 
countries.  This is why the further empirical research will be based on it. 
4.2. What is Easier to Forecast?  
According to the hypothesis, the economic forecasts provided by the IMF are more 
accurate in the developed countries comparing to the developing ones.  The interpretation 
of the forecasting accuracy can be regarded as an indicator of the statistical institutions 
performance for country-groups. 
The rationale behind this hypothesis lies in the predictability of the development path of 
developed countries versus the developing ones.  The low-income countries are, 
generally, assumed to have a more volatile path of growth, making the economic 
variables to be hardly predictable, while the growth itself is not sustainable, but rather 
sporadic (Anbarci, Hill & Kirmanoglu 2011).  The unpredictability and high volatility is 
not only a weak economy indicator, but also represents a negative externality given that 
policies and decisions are based on erroneous predictions (Mobarak 2005).  A survey 
conducted by Harris International in 2006 showed that about 75% of the wrong business 
decisions are taken because of the erroneous data. 




(i) Poor countries are specialized in fewer and more volatile sectors; 
(ii) Poor countries experience more severe and more frequent aggregate shocks; 
(iii) Poor countries’ macroeconomic fluctuations are more highly correlated with 
the shocks affecting the sectors they specialize in. 
Taking these supportive arguments into account, the hypothesis that is to be analyzed is: 
IMF economic forecasts are more accurate in the developed countries comparing to the 
developing ones. 
4.3. Description of the Dataset 
The hypothesis will be tested on a dataset of 15 developed countries and 15 developing 
countries (Table 4.1), World Economic Outlook (IMF) being the primary and only source 
of data. 
Table 4.1: Dataset Country-List 















United Kingdom Ukraine 
 
The panel data includes 4 economic variables.  Two of them are actual values for: the 
percentage change in the Gross Domestic Product in current prices (actual GDP growth 
rate) and the percentage change of inflation, average consumer prices (actual inflation 
rate).  The values for these variables are taken from the next-year reports (e.g. the GDP 
growth in Luxembourg for the year 2007 was 5.336% as mentioned in the World 
Economic Outlook from April 2008). 
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The other two variables represent forecasted values: forecasted GDP growth rate and 
forecasted inflation rate.  Their values are taken from the one-year-before reports (e.g. the 
forecasted GDP growth in Luxembourg for the year 2007 was 3.8% as mentioned in the 
WEO from April 2006). 
The dataset has 22 time-periods, covering the years 2000 to 2010
22
 on a semiannual basis, 
such that the dataset includes all forecasting adjustments as well as the actual data 
updates every 6 months (e.g. the actual GDP growth in Luxembourg for the year 2007 
was 5.336% as mentioned in the WEO report from April 2008, while the same variable 
for the same country and same year provided in the following WEO report from October 
2008 was updated to 4.475%).  Respectively there are two sets of information generated 
in the same year: April and September/October. 
It is worth mentioning that the actual data that will be used in the analysis is rather a 
nowcasted data than an actual one since it doesn’t incorporate the very last update of the 
respective variable but reflects only the 1-year after value which can be and usually is 
subject to change.  This, however, allows having a dataset with symmetric variables in 
terms of time, since forecasts and nowcasts are available one-year before and one-year 
after the observed period. 
4.4. Methodology Description 
In order to test the hypothesis six distinctive forecasting performance measures will be 
used.  All of them describe the inaccuracy of the performed forecasts, such that the 
greater their value is, the more erroneousness the forecast is as comparing to the actual 
value.  All of these measures are meaningless if computed independently such that for 
relevancy there should be at least two points of comparison.  The comparison in our case 
will be done between the developed and developing countries, trying assessing for which 
the forecasted data is more accurate. 
Important to mention, there are two different errors which are calculated yearly based on 
the next-year data       
     
 and       
    
 from which the one-year-before forecast is 
subtracted        
     
 and        
    
. Such that: 
                                                   
22
 The forecasts are taken from the WEO reports in the period 1999 to 2009, whilst the actual data are taken  
from the next-year-reports: 2001 to 2011. 
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April absolute forecast error 
in year     
     
       
     
        
     
 4.4.1 
September absolute forecast 
error in year     
    
       
    
        
    
 4.4.2 
At this stage, the contrast between developed and developing countries forecasting 
performance can be represented in a time evolution of the respective errors, where a null 
error indicates a perfect forecast. 
In the Figure 4.1 is represented the evolution in time of the average absolute forecasting 
error for the GDP growth rate.  Visibly, the developed countries were outperforming the 
developing ones since 2003.  As it should be expected, the errors were significantly 
higher during the financial crisis for both groups of countries, being expressed in high 
error values starting with the end of the 2008
th
 year. 
Figure 4.1: Average Absolute Forecasting Error of GDP Growth Rate 
 
Source: Author’s computation 
As well as the plot for GDP growth rate errors, the one for inflation percentage change 
errors (Figure 4.2) shows a slightly smoother difference between the errors, with the 
exception of the beginning of the year 2000, when developing countries considerably 
under-forecasted the actual inflation rate. 
But even with a less notable difference between the errors, the developing countries seem 
to be on average above the developed countries errors-line, which reveals that the 










2000 P1 2002 P1 2004 P1 2006 P1 2008 P1 2010 P1
Average absolute Forecasting Error per Period (GDP growth rate, developed countries)
Average absolute Forecasting Error per Period (GDP growth rate, developing countries)
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Figure 4.2: Average Absolute Forecasting Error of Inflation 
 
Source: Author’s computation 
The plotted average absolute forecasting errors for both GDP growth rate and inflation 
rate show that the developed countries are on average outperforming the developing ones.  
Further several analytical tools will be applied in order to test this evidence and to give a 
quantitative justification on which the final conclusion on the comparative performance 
of the analyzed groups of countries will be based. 
All forecasting performance measures that will be further introduced are computed based 
on the forecast error:    on a semiannual basis. 
4.4.1. Mean Squared Error 
Mean Squared Error or Mean Squared Deviation is one of the most widely used methods 
to evaluate forecasting performance.  The higher the MSE is, the less accurate is the 
forecast and the more it deviates from the value of the actual variable. 
Even though the measure succeeds to include all the observations in the result it gives, it 
is negatively influenced by the outliers that can cause a deviation from a true MSE value.  
However, there is no correct or incorrect value that MSE should take, however a lower 
MSE value is always preferred over a higher one. 
     
 
 
    
 
 











2000 P1 2002 P1 2004 P1 2006 P1 2008 P1 2010 P1
Average absolute Forecasting Error per Period (Inflation percentage change, developed countries)
Average absolute Forecasting Error per Period (Inflation percentage change, developing countries)
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4.4.2. Root-Mean Squared Error 
RMSE is a measure based on the MSE, practically being the square root of it.  And as 
well as MSE, RMSE penalizes more the large errors, such that outliers have a significant 
influence on the final result. 
However, if the MSE gives the result measured in the squared average error units, RMSE 
gives directly the size of the average error being expressed in the same scale as the 
analyzed data. 
       
 
 
    
 
 
   
      4.4.4 
4.4.3. Mean Absolute Percentage Error 
MAPE shows the inaccuracy of the forecasted data which is expressed preferably in a 
ratio-scale (Ahlburg 1992), as it is in our case.  However there are four computational 
problems that determine it (Makridakis 1993): 
1. Equal errors above the actual value result in a greater APE than those below the 
actual value, which is an asymmetry problem; 
2. Extremely large percentage errors are to be expected with small values of the 
dataset (usually less than 1); 
3. The outliers can excite also extremely large errors which distort the comparison; 
4. MAPE is not comparable with other measures. 
      
 
 
         
 
   
 4.4.5 
4.4.4. Mean Absolute Deviation 
MAD is known for the correction of the cancelling out effect, such that the average of 
errors are done on their absolute values, by that keeping the influence of all deviations at 
a same level, independently on their sign. 
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 4.4.6 
4.4.5. Largest Absolute Deviation 
LAD is a measure that shows the most aggressive outlier-error in its absolute value.  It is 
perhaps irrelevant to use only this measure independently to conclude on the overall 
forecasting performance.  But in combination with the other measures it contributes to a 
more comprehensive conclusion on the overall performance. 
             4.4.7 
4.4.6. Median Absolute Error 
The advantage of using MeAE is its unaffectedness by outliers, however it doesn’t take 
into account all observations, thus why MeAE, as well as LAD, should be used only in 
combination with some other measures to be more reliable. 
                 4.4.8 
4.5. Interpretation of the Results 
After applying the above mentioned forecasting accuracy evaluation measures on the 
GDP growth rate and inflation percentage change for the developed and respectively 
developing countries, the following results were obtained: 
Table 4.2: Forecasting Performance Evaluation Output 
 Developed Countries Developing Countries 
GDP g.r. Inflation p.c. GDP g.r. Inflation p.c. 
MSE 5.0239 1.1469 27.7003 141.1347 
RMSE 2.2414 1.0709 5.2631 11.8800 
MAPE 3.0418 1.7635 0.9537 9.9884 
MAD 1.6444 0.8041 3.4771 4.6001 
LAD 9.8710 4.7000 22.4230 139.0000 
MeAE 1.1050 0.6295 2.1660 2.3065 
Source: Author’s computations in Excel 
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According to the outcome from Table 4.2, the forecasting performance of the inflation 
percentage change is strictly more accurate in the developed countries as compared to the 
developing ones (the error measures are strictly higher), which is in line with the output 
of all six measures that were calculated. 
When it comes to GDP growth rate the same conclusion holds with the exception of one 
measure that shows a counter-intuitive result.  The Mean Absolute Percentage Error 
indicates that developing countries’ forecasts are more accurate: 
                                      
One of the explications of this result can be the impact of the outliers which tend to cause 
overinflated results.  This problem can be corrected by deleting outliers from the dataset 
and obtaining a non-biased measure.  However, this approach is not recommended by 
Makridakis (1993) who points that, especially in economics, outliers are costly and 
undesirable but they must be known to the decision-makers as they drive the data. 
Moreover, as mentioned previously, the original dataset small values can spoil the MAPE 
result by inflating it.  If comparing the number of GDP growth rates below one unit for 
the observed group of countries, the following distinction can be seen: out of 330 
observations, developed countries have 60 observations contained in the       interval in 
their absolute value, while for the developing countries this number is about six times 
lower: 9 observations only contained in the interval      .  Partially, this justification 
explains the MAPE result and its biasness since small values dataset usually generates 
larger error values than large values dataset does. 
However, out of six measures of forecasting performance five show that the developed 
countries forecast-errors for the GDP growth rate are lower than those of the developing 
countries.  This is a strong argument to state that the forecasts of the respective variable 
for the developed countries are more accurate than for the developing countries. 
Consequently, we can conclude on the example of a two group of countries (developed 
and developing ones) that the level of development of the country (whether it is 
developed or developing) is directly and positively correlated with the credibility and 
accuracy of the forecasts.  This has been shown on the example of the GDP growth rate 
and inflation percentage change. 
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The main implication of this result is that developing countries are struggling with the 
misleading data trap (Figure 4.3).  The misleading forecasts on which developing 
countries rely (and which are more erroneous than the developed countries forecasts) are 
an additional factor causing policies to be less efficient.  As has been mentioned, the good 
decisions and policies are directly and strongly correlated with the quality of the data 
which the policy-makers are operating with. Based on 6 forecasting evaluation measures 
it has been shown that the developing countries are provided by the IMF with a more 
erroneous set of forecasts as compared to the developed countries. This can lead to the 
following set of harmful consequences: 
(i) Finance-related impact (lower revenues, overestimated expenses, etc.); 
(ii) Risk-related impact (investment risk, competitiveness risk, corruption, etc.); 
(iii) Productivity-related impact (delayed decisions, decreased quality, etc.); 
(iv) Confidence-related impact (credibility and reputation issues, etc.). 
Additionally, in the vast majority of cases forecasts are based on the assumption that 
economic policies will not change during the forecast period (Masi 1996), which is not 
always the case. And, inversely, the economic policies and decisions are based on the 
strong assumption that the forecasts will not deviate significantly. 
Figure 4.3: Misleading Data Trap in Developing Countries 
Source: Author’s representation 
Consequently, it is not only the volatile economy what causes misleading forecasts in the 
developing countries, but the poor data quality itself is a factor catching and maintaining 
the country in its under-developed level since policy-makers rely in the decision making 
process on some erroneous data about the future state of the economy. Accordingly, the 



















V. THE OPTIMISM BIAS ANALYSIS IN IMF FORECASTS 
“Indeed, markets rely for their existence on 
emotions.” 
(David Orrell) 
5.1. Defining Optimism Bias 
The relatively recent discipline, behavioral economics, has identified that human 
decision-makers exhibit a number of systematic biases observed in reality, as well as in 
the lab experiments (Keith et al. 2006).  The impartiality of the people in the decision-
making processes is, however, not a recent subject.  It has been also discussed in details 
in the Adam Smith’s book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments.  Smith referred to the 
subject of rationality versus emotionality, introducing the idea of an impartial spectator 
as a judge of our conduct who can be no other person than us, ourselves. 
However, our views are apt to be subjective, and are so when it is the most important to 
be otherwise (Smith 1853). But even with recognized impartiality, the level of the self-
overconfidence is significant. This problem is not negligible especially in policy-making 
where, according to Angner (2006), only institutional constraints can increase the 
accountability. 
Furthermore, not only an overconfident behavior is a significant guiding bias, but also the 
propensity to use affect for judgment is even stronger as people get older, as the research 
conducted by Weierich et al. (2011) found.  Thus, the more experienced economists are, 
the more they use their own opinion and intuition rather than the objective knowledge: 
which we do not necessarily highlight as a disadvantage for the outcomes of their work. 
Generally, the use of emotiveness to make predictions is a natural expression of the 
human state.  The economic predictions are not an exception.  The bias which is of 
particular interest in this work is the optimism bias. 
The optimism (or optimistic) bias introduces the mistaken belief that one’s chances of 
experiencing a negative event are lower than those of one’s pears, while the chances of 
experiencing a positive event are higher.  The optimism bias is a theory formulated in 
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1980 by Weinstein Neil and is also known as unrealistic optimism, positivity illusion, 
illusion of unique invulnerability or personal fable. 
The practical realization of the optimistic bias would be reflected in a situation in which 
the majority of the individuals in a group are above the group average, which cannot be 
true, thus, as Klein (2006) argues, optimism bias is a bias at the level of the group. 
And even if the name bias is interpreted with a negative meaning (at least in 
econometrics), the optimistic bias itself is not always a bad thing to happen.  As pointed 
by Ariely (2009), without an optimistic bias, people would be very risk averse: there 
would be much less start-ups, businesses, fewer sectors explored, fewer investments.  
Without an optimistic bias consumers would consume less and producers would produce 
less by that smoothening and slowing down the economic development and growth. 
However, optimistic bias is one of the reasons of forecasting inaccuracy and, as it has 
been shown in McKinsey Quarterly from April 2010 (Figure 5.1), the optimism bias can 
be observed in the updated forecasts for the earnings per share, where the exceptions to 
the long pattern of excessively optimistic forecasts are rare. 
Figure 5.1: Optimism Bias on S&P 500 companies EPS Forecast Update 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S Global Aggregates; McKinsey Analysis 
Besides the optimistic bias which has an implication on the economic forecasting and is 
to be further tested, there is also known the affective forecasting bias – a social 
phenomenon developed by two Harvard professors, Wilson T. & D. Gilbert (2005). They 
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have introduced the affective forecasting23, providing a partially contrary prediction than 
the optimism bias does.  Both concepts suggest an overprediction of the positive-meaning 
variables, but they diverge in predictions for the negative-meaning variables. 
Figure 5.2: Affective Forecasting Representation 
 
Source: Wilson T. & D. Gilbert, 2005 
While optimism bias suggests that negative-meaning variables will be on average 
underpredicted, the affective forecasting suggests overprediction relying on the people’s 
tendency to exaggerate perception about the future in all situations. 
In our research we test the hypotheses of optimistic bias presence in the IMF forecasts for 
GDP growth rate and inflation rate. The hypotheses will be tested based on the IMF, 
World Economic Outlook dataset, as already described in Chapter IV, 4.3. The positive-
meaning variable to be analyzed will be GDP growth rate, whilst the negative-meaning 
variable: inflation rate. Respectively, the summarized hypotheses are the following: 
I. IMF forecasts for the GDP growth rate are on average overestimated comparing 
to actual ex post values; 
II. IMF forecasts for the inflation rate are on average underestimated comparing to 
actual ex post values. 
The econometric analysis is performed in STATA and GRETL software. 
 
 
                                                   
23
 “Research on affective forecasting has shown that people routinely mispredict how much pleasure or 
displeasure future events will bring. […] More common than underestimating future emotional reactions, 
[…] people overestimate the intensity and duration of their emotional reactions to future events.” Wilson, 
Gilbert, Affective Forecasting. Knowing What to Want, 2. 
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5.2. Testing Optimism Bias on GDP growth rate forecasts 
The overprediction in the GDP growth rate forecasts by the IMF has been already 
captured by many economists suggesting that forecasts are on average higher than the 
actual data. But this result is not consistent over all analyses.  
Timmermann (2006) analyzed the IMF forecasts for 178 countries for the period 1990-
2003 and concluded that WEO forecasts for real GDP growth display a tendency for 
systematic, persistent over time overprediction.  Julio and Esperança (2012) evaluated the 
quality of OECD and IMF forecasts for GDP growth rate between 1994 and 2010 for the 
G7 countries and concluded on the presence of overprediction which is caused primarily, 
according to their results, by overpredictions in investments and net exports. 
Takagi and Kucur (2006) conducted an analysis of the IMF‘s GDP growth rate forecasts 
during 1994–2003 (on 107 countries), the results suggesting a heterogeneous forecasting 
performance across regions: optimism in Africa and Latin America, pessimism in 
industrial countries and the Middle East, and lack of systematic bias in emerging Asia 
and transition countries.  The authors found that optimism bias is more characteristic to 
the countries benefiting directly from IMF programs. 
The empirical analysis that will be further conducted will be focused on the recent data 
covering the period between 2000 to 2010
24
.  The available panel dataset is strongly 
balanced which reflects that all countries have the data for all observed years. 
Table 5.1: GDP Growth Rate Statistics Description 
Variable         |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
fc_gdp   overall |  3.342667   2.040226         -4         10 |     N =     660 
         between |             1.338859   1.676455      6.185 |     n =      30 
         within  |             1.557915  -5.333288   7.813349 |     T =      22 
                 |                                            | 
act_gdp  overall |  3.084665   4.385921    -18.016       13.9 |     N =     660 
         between |             1.925832   .4754545   7.854727 |     n =      30 
         within  |             3.955459  -19.19306    10.9628 |     T =      22 
Source: Author’s computations in STATA 
As can be noticed from the descriptive statistics in Table 5.1, there are 660 observations 
for 30 countries over 22 periods (11 years, 2000-2010, on a semiannual basis).  The data 
                                                   
24
 The forecasts are taken from the WEO reports in the period 1999 to 2009, whilst the actual data are taken 
from the next-year-reports: 2001 to 2011. 
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shows that the forecasted GDP growth mean is higher than the mean of the actual one-
year-after value.  However, the overprediction itself will be further analyzed using some 
more technical-analytical methods. 
The descriptive statistics also captured the two types of variability in the data: within 
(among the data for particular country) and between (the variability between countries).  
Both of them are higher for the actual data of GDP growth suggesting that forecasts are 
usually smoother, with a stronger mean than the actual data. 
The empirical model to be further tested is represented in the (5.2.1) equation. And it will 
be regressed using four different models for panel data (Pooled OLS, LSDV, FE and RE): 
                                 5.2.1 
In this model          stands for the next-year (actual) data for GDP growth rate, while 
         reflects the one-year-before forecast.  The indices are to be interpreted as follows: 
the first one is a country index (         ; the second index stands for the 22 
observed time-series (                         ; whilst the third index stands for 
the year in which the data for ( ) was released: (t+1) standing for the one-year-after 
actual data, (t-1) – one-year-before forecast. 
The equation (5.2.1) is a one-way-error-component model, in which the error term is 
composed of a country specific, time invariant component (   ) and a reminder 
disturbance term (     ), as presented in the equation (5.2.2). 
                 5.2.2 
Respectively, the initial model can be rewritten as: 
                                     5.2.3 
After performing all necessary tests and deriving the correct model and coefficients for 
the above presented regression, the following two tests will be used for identifying the 
presence of the optimism bias in the IMF forecasts: 
(i) Test for the Efficiency of Projections; 
(ii) Test for the Unbiasedness of Projections. 
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Both tests have been practically used by Barrionuevo (1993), Artis (1997), Gavin & 
Mandal (2003), as well as Takagi & Kucur (2006).  They have also analyzed the 
optimism bias on the IMF projections being focused, however, on some older datasets. 
Before proceeding to IMF Projections efficiency and unbiasedness testing, we estimate 
the following pairs of models: pooled ordinary least squares versus least squares dummy 
variable model and fixed effects versus random effects model for panel data. 
5.2.1. Pooled OLS versus LSDV Model 
Pooled OLS model is the basic panel data model which analyzes the influence of the 
forecasted GDP growth rate and of the year-dummy variables on the actual GDP growth 
rate variable.  The basic intuition guides us to believe that this equation does not omit any 
significant information given that the forecasted value of a variable should contain in it 
all relevant information for the actual variable value.  
From the POLS regression output (Table AP1), we obtain a result which reveals a 
strongly significant value of the forecasted inflation coefficient (        ).  
POLS model:                                           5.2.4 
However, given the simplicity of the POLS assumptions we can suspect several errors 
affecting the results.  In this respect, we consider the abnormality of errors distribution as 
a potential problem, and we test it using a heteroskedasticity test.  In our regression the 
heteroskedasticity might appear due to GDP growth rate fluctuations: drops during crises 
and jumps during economic booms which are not captured by forecasts and which might 
serve as a significant factor to forecasts underperformance. 
As can be seen from Figure 5.3, the distribution of the errors does not seem normal, given 
that the left tail of the distribution is larger than the right one. 
For the heteroskedasticity test, we consider two hypotheses. Under the first one we 
ascertain that the model errors have a constant variance: 
H0:             
   Homoskedasticity; 
HA:            




Figure 5.3: Box-Plot of the GDP Growth Rate Model Errors  
Source: Author’s Computations, GRETL 
In order to perform the test, we used the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity. Based on the test outcome (Table 5.2) we strongly reject the null 
hypothesis of homoskedasticity in favor of heteroskedasticity. 
Table 5.2: GDP Growth Rate: Heteroskedasticity Test for POLS Model 
hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of act_gdp 
 
         chi2(1)      =    90.94 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
Source: Author’s computation using STATA 
The robust option is further used in our regression in order to control for the 
heteroskedasticity effects and to obtain the true standard errors for the coefficients. After 
a robust regression, the coefficients do not change, while the standard error of the 
forecasted inflation rate slightly increases (Table AP2). 
Additionally, we test for multicollinearity which is the situation in which two or more 
explanatory variables are highly linearly related. Given that our regression includes 21 
dummy variables we should consider the multicollinearity as a potential problem. The 
VIF test results (Table AP3), however, reject multicollinearity, given that test value is 




At the further stage we estimate the LSDV model which is also known as fixed effects 
least squares model.  As compared to the POLS, LSDV considers not only time-
dummies, but also individual-dummies (country).  From the regression output (Table 
AP4) we note that forecasted inflation (        ) which is significant under a 90% 
confidence level, is considerably smaller than the same coefficient provided by the POLS 
regression. 
LSDV model:                                      5.2.5 
Furthermore, as compared to the POLS model, the LSDV one includes more dummy 
variables (+29), suggesting that a loss of degrees of freedom caused by such a large 
number of independent variables can potentially caused some multicollinearity problems. 
Using the VIF test we find (Table AP5) that even though the value of the test is slightly 
higher than the one for POLS test (            ), these linear dependencies among 
explanatory variables are negligible. 
As already explained, the difference between POLS and LSDV models consists in the 
presence of country-dummy variables in the latter model. Respectively, in order to test 
which of the two models has a greater explanatory power over the relationship between 
actual and forecasted GDP growth rate we consider testing for the joint-significance of 
country-dummy variables. The hypotheses to be tested on the LSDV model are: 
H0:                                                  
HA: at least one country-dummy variable is significant. 
According to the F-test results (Table AP4) we reject the null hypothesis under a 90% 
significance level and we find the country-dummy variables significant.  Therefore, we 
conclude that LSDV model is preferred over the pooled OLS model. 
Finally, in order to ensure that the within variability in the LSDV model is fully captured, 
while the standard errors are robust, we use the cluster feature (Table AP6) which ensures 
that the model regression takes into account variables grouped per country.  The cluster 
option could not be included into the model before the F-test given that the number of 
clusters should be significantly larger than the number of restrictions which doesn’t hold 




5.2.2. FE versus RE Model: Hausman Specification Test 
The main distinction between the FE and RE models concerns in the assumption that 
under the RE model there is no correlation between the explanatory variable and the error 
term.  The FE model does not assume correlation being equal to zero (the country-
specific error is considered to be a non-random parameter, dummy variable).  However, 
the large number of variables in the FE model causes a considerable loss of degrees of 
freedom which can be avoided by assuming errors random (Baltagi 2005).  
In order to find the best model to be used, the Hausman Specification Test (Hausman 
1978) is considered.  This test compares the fixed effects and random effects models’ 
parameters, concluding on the correlation between regressors and model error: 
 H0:            
         - Random Effects model preferred; 
HA:            
         - Fixed Effects model preferred. 
The test is based on two estimates (the coefficients from the random and, respectively, 
fixed effects models for the forecasted GDP growth rate variable).  The RE model 
coefficient (     ) is consistent and efficient under H0 and becomes inconsistent under 
HA; while the FE model coefficient (     ) is consistent and inefficient under H0 and 
inconsistent under HA. The test resides primarily on the estimation of  (5.2.6). 
               
 
                        
  
                     
  
5.2.6 
If   is significant, given an asymptotic distribution with    standing for the number of 
regressors in the within regression, we reject H0, and FE model is preferred. 
Before proceeding to the Hausman Specification Test estimation, the random effects 
model is regressed and the estimates are stored (Table AP7). The same is done for the 
fixed effects model (Table AP8). The models outputs for these regressions are 
summarized in the (5.2.7) and (5.2.8) equations. The FE model, additionally, requires a 
test for the presence of the fixed effects, which assumes testing for the joint-significance 
of the year dummy-variables. The test for the fixed effects, thus, has the hypotheses: 
H0:                                                
HA: at least one year-dummy variable is   . 
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From the test output in Table AP9, we conclude that the year-dummy variables in the FE 
model are strongly jointly-significant. Further we proceed to comparison of the RE and 
FE models using the Hausman Specification Test. 
FE Model:                                          5.2.7 
RE Model:                                          5.2.8 
The saved estimates of the RE and FE models are further tested for the relationship 
between the independent variable (forecasted GDP growth rate) and the error term. 
Hausman Test results are presented in Table AP10.  
From the test results we conclude that we cannot reject the null hypothesis.  Respectively 
we find a close to zero correlation between the model’s error and the explanatory 
variable            
         . Accordingly, in the further estimations we give preference 
to RE model over the FE model. 
5.2.3. GDP Growth Rate Model: Empirical Models Comparison 
So far we have regressed four different models representing the relationship between the 
actual and forecasted GDP growth rate.  The models results are summarized in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3: GDP Growth Rate Models Comparison: POLS, LSDV, FE and RE 
 Pooled OLS LSDV FE RE 
















Source: Author’s computation using STATA 
The zero-restriction imposed on the country-dummy variables showed that LSDV model 
is preferred over the POLS model, while Hausman Specification Test did not reject the 
hypothesis of a zero correlation between the independent variable and the error term, 
concluding on the preference of RE model over the FE model.  Respectively, for the 
further tests of efficiency and unbiasedness of IMF projections concerning the GDP 




5.2.4. Test for Efficiency of GDP Growth Rate IMF Projections 
The efficiency of projections refers to the test of the volume of information contained in 
the forecast.  A perfectly efficient projection has no error, a zero-intercept and a 
coefficient of the independent variable equal to one.  The test for the efficiency of 
projections, introduced by Barrionuevo (1993), compares the following hypotheses: 
H0:              Projections are Efficient; 
 HA:              Projections are Inefficient. 
The joint-hypothesis is tested using linear restrictions and F-test which are applied on 
both models: LSDV and RE. According to test results (Table AP11 and Table AP12) we 
strongly reject the null-hypothesis for both models and conclude that the projections 
provided by IMF are inefficient. 
These results are consistent with the evidences from Tagaci and Kucur (2006) who have 
also determined that the inefficiency of IMF projections is especially distinguishable for 
the industrial countries, Middle East, and Emerging Asia.  The inefficiency of IMF 
forecasts informs us on the presence of an either upwards or downwards bias. 
5.2.5. Test for Unbiasedness of GDP Growth Rate IMF Projections 
The analysis of the GDP growth rate forecasts errors and model errors will help building 
a stronger image on the existence or inexistence of the optimism bias. In this respect it is 
important to mention that model error and forecast error are two different concepts, the 
first standing for the difference between actual and fitted value of the explained variable, 
while the former standing for the difference between actual and forecasted value. 
Model Error:                         5.2.9 
Fitted Value:                           5.2.10 
Forecast Error:                        5.2.11 
The average forecast error per country for the observed period is represented in Figure 
5.4. Interestingly to notice, there can be seen only 6 countries (all of them being 
developing countries: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine) out of 
56 
 
30 for which IMF on average underestimated the forecasts, while for all 24 others the 
forecasts were on average overpredicted (Table AP13). 
Figure 5.4: GDP Growth Rate Forecast Errors per Country 
 
Source: Author’s computations, IMF Data 
The unbiasedness test, suggested by Tagaci and Kucur (2006), is used to determine the 
relationship between the forecast error and model error (5.2.12). 
                 5.2.12 
Respectively, the two hypotheses of the unbiasedness test are as follows: 
 Ho:       - IMF predictions are unbiased; 
HA:       - IMF predictions are biased. 
In order to test the null hypothesis we apply a null-intercept restriction on the (5.2.12) 
equation for both considered models, LSDV and RE.  Afterwards we use an F-test to base 
the conclusion on.  The output for the models is represented in Table AP14 (LSDV) and 
Table AP15 (RE).  According to the outputs of the F-tests, we reject the IMF 
unbiasedness hypothesis under a 95% confidence level interval.  This conclusion is 
sustainable for both models.  
Moreover, the unbiasedness test shows that on average IMF overpredicts the GDP growth 
rate for the observed countries by 0.258% (absolute value).  This empirically confirms the 











5.2.6. GDP Growth Rate and Optimism Bias: Results Interpretation 
In order to attest the optimism bias presence in the GDP growth rate forecasts which are 
released by the IMF, we have analyzed several models in which the dependent variable 
was represented by the actual one-year-after value of the GDP growth rate, while the 
independent variable was the forecasted one-year-before value of the same variable. 
The models that we have analyzed were: pooled OLS, LSDV, RE model and FE model. 
The F-test, analyzing the significance of the country-dummy variables, showed that 
LSDV model (5.2.5) is preferred over the pooled OLS model.  We found the country-
dummy variables being significant in explaining the accuracy of forecast.  On the other 
hand, Hausman Specification Test gave preference to RE model (5.2.8) over the FE 
model based on the finding of an insignificant correlation between forecasted GDP 
growth rate and the residual of the model. 
The efficiency of projections test rejected the efficient predictions hypothesis.  The 
respective conclusion was consistent with the results in both considered models (LSDV 
and RE model) which supported projections inefficiency under a 99% confidence level.  
The unbiasedness test specifically pointed that IMF projections for the GDP growth rate 
are biased upwards (under a 95% confidence level), such that on average GDP growth 
rate forecasts provided by the respective institution, for the 30 countries which were 
observed in the analysis, is overestimated by 0.258%, in absolute values. 
Respectively, the performed analysis found a considerable upward bias of the GDP 
growth rate forecasts. We found that the optimism bias is present in the evaluated dataset.  
5.3. Testing Optimism Bias on Inflation rate Forecasts 
According to Bulíř et al. (2007) inflation forecast is one of the most important 
communication tools used by the central monetary institutions, being one of the 
determinants of the actual inflation by having a direct impact on the price level 
expectation.  The overprediction of the inflation rate can be an important factor for per se 
having a high inflation, thus the underprediction is a rational tool for maintaining prices 
at a lower level.  From this perspective we further test the hypothesis of optimism bias in 
IMF projections for the inflation rate which supposes its underprediction. 
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The so far performed researches on the accuracy of IMF predictions of the inflation rate 
in several lines accepted and rejected the hypothesis of optimism in forecasts. 
Timmermann (2006) conducted an analysis of the optimism bias in the IMF inflation rate 
predictions for 178 countries, for the period 1990-2003 and concluded that on average 
there is a downward bias in forecasts, while the underestimation is especially significant 
for many African, Central and Eastern European, and Western Hemisphere countries. 
Dreher et al. (2007) investigated the IMF inflation forecasts for 157 countries (1999-
2005) and found that countries with large loans outstanding from the IMF received lower 
inflation forecasts, suggesting that the IMF engages in “defensive forecasting.”  A 
complex view on the accuracy of IMF projections is given by Tuguci & Kucur (2006) 
who have analyzed 105 countries (1994-2003).  They concluded that the inflation rate 
forecasts for emerging Asia and transition economies did not have a consistent bias; the 
forecasts for Latin America were pessimistic, while those for Middle East - optimistic. 
We are going to test the optimism bias presence in the IMF forecasts for inflation rate 
across 30 countries.  The dataset has similar time and individual dimensions as the GDP 
growth rate dataset had. There are 22 periods for examination and two main variables to 
be evaluated are the one-year-before forecast and one-year-after actual inflation rate. 
Table 5.4: Inflation Rate Descriptive Statistics 
Variable         |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
fc_infl  overall |  5.170952   12.75538     -3.527        250 |     N =     660 
         between |              6.85072          1   35.43768 |     n =      30 
         within  |              10.8288  -24.24373   219.7333 |     T =      22 
                 |                                            | 
act_infl overall |  6.054215   12.07192     -1.224        169 |     N =     660 
         between |             7.339349   .9391818   34.60459 |     n =      30 
         within  |             9.673759  -21.55038   140.4496 |     T =      22 
Source: Author’s Computation, STATA 
The summary of the initial data (Table 5.4) presents that the available dataset covers 22 
time-periods across 30 countries.  The analysis of within and between variability shows 
that while the forecasted inflation has a smaller variability for the data between countries, 
the actual value of the inflation has a smaller variability for within country data. 
The mean of the variables is higher for actual inflation rate values comparing to the 
forecasts suggesting that, at this stage, we can suspect average underprediction. 
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In order to test if the forecasts of the inflation rate are underestimated, the model (5.3.1) 
will be used.  The relationship between forecasted inflation and actual inflation will be 
analyzed, similarly to the GDP growth rate case, from four perspectives: pooled OLS 
model, LSDV, RE and FE models.  Out of these four models we will select two in order 
to test the efficiency and unbiasedness of IMF projections for the inflation rate. 
                               5.3.1 
In the general inflation model          stands for one-year-after data, while          reflects 
one-year-before forecast for inflation rate.  The constant term is represented by   , the 
coefficient is  , while the model error term (    ) can be decomposed into a country-
specific error component (  ), and a residual reminder component (    ). 
              5.3.2 
In order to test the optimism bias in our data we will first compare the POLS, LSDV, RE 
and FE models. The F-test for the significance of the country-dummy variables will 
provide info for selecting either POLS or LSDV model as being more comprehensive in 
explaining the relationship between our variables, while Hausman Test will compare FE 
and RE models results. On the chosen models two sets of tests will be performed: test for 
efficiency of projections and test for their unbiasedness. 
5.3.1. Pooled OLS versus LSDV Model 
The pooled OLS, considered in this respect as a benchmark to more sophisticated models, 
gives a simplistic overview on the relationship between inflation forecast and actual data. 
Regardless of being easy to run, the POLS model can be subject to several types of 
errors, thus after modeling the initial regression (Table AP16), we can suspect that the 
errors of the model are not normally distributed. This intuition arises from the inflation 
uncertainty which can vary from crisis periods to booms. 
POLS model:                                     5.3.3 
Figure 5.5 gives an intuition for non-normal distribution of the residuals given a fatter 
right-hand side tale where most of the model errors are placed. 
The Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg heteroskedasticity test is used to test if the variance 
of the residuals in the model is constant or not.  The hypotheses of this test are: 
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H0:             
   Homoskedasticity; 
HA:            
   Heteroskedasticity. 
Figure 5.5: Inflation Rate, POLS Model Errors Distribution 
Source: Author’s computations in GRETL 
According to the test results (Table 5.5), we strongly reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that the variance of the errors in the POLS model is not constant. 
Table 5.5: Inflation Rate, Heteroskedasticity Test for POLS Model 
hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of act_infl 
 
         chi2(1)      =  2049.41 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
Source: Author’s computation using STATA 
In order to control for heteroskedasticity in the POLS model we use the robust command. 
The regression output (Table AP17) shows that the estimators of the model did not 
change, however the standard errors increased for the forecasted inflation rate estimator, 
while the standard deviations for all the others estimators decreased. 
Additionally, the VIF test (Table AP18) shows that there is no multicollinearity problem 
in the data, test value being at a tolerable level (            ). 
Further we proceed with the estimation of the LSDV model which is a replication of the 
POLS with the exception of 29 country-dummy variables (out of 30) which are added 
into the model (Table AP19). 
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LSDV model:                                     5.3.4 
The significance of the individual (country) dummies is to be further tested using an F-
test with a joint zero-restriction, such that according to this test results we can conclude if 
the country-dummy variable is important in characterizing the IMF projections accuracy 
for the inflation rate.  The F-test hypotheses are as follows: 
H0:                                                   
HA: at least one country-dummy variable is significant. 
After regression of the initial model and testing for the significance of country-dummy 
variables (Table AP19), we conclude that we can strongly reject the null hypothesis. 
Respectively, we give preference to the LSDV model as compared to the POLS model 
based on the joint significance of the country-dummy variables. 
Additionally in order to remove any heteroskedasticity from the LSDV model, as well as 
for removing any serial correlation, we use the cluster option for countries (Table AP20). 
The VIF test (Table AP21) finds no multicollinearity problems (            ). 
5.3.2. FE and RE Model: Hausman Specification Test 
The other two models to be derived and compared are fixed effects and random effects 
model. While random effects model (Table AP22) assumes that there is no correlation 
between inflation forecast and the error term (which is assumed to be random), the fixed 
effects model (Table AP23) regards the country specific time invariant effect as 
independent variable which has a non-zero correlation with the explanatory variable. 
RE model:                                     5.3.5 
FE model:                                     5.3.6 
Before proceeding to the Hausman Test we also check for the presence of the fixed 
effects in the FE model. We use an F-test and evaluate the joint significance of the year 
dummies. The test for fixed effects has the following hypotheses: 
H0:                                                
HA: at least one year-dummy variable is   . 
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According to the test results (Table AP24), we reject the null hypothesis under a 99% 
confidence level interval and find the fixed effects present in the FE model. 
Hausman Specification Test is further used to compare the RE and FE models. 
 H0:            
       - Random Effects model preferred;  
HA:            
       - Fixed Effects model preferred. 
According to the performed test (Table AP25), we strongly reject the null hypothesis, and 
conclude that the fixed effects model is preferred over the RE model.  Consequently, we 
find that the inflation rate model hides a non-zero correlation between the country 
specific effects and the explanatory variables. 
Moreover, unlike the RE model, FE model requires a test for heteroskedasticity. In order 
to test if the FE model errors have a constant variance we use the Modified Wald Test, 
according to which we strongly reject the homoskedasticity hypothesis and conclude that 
the further estimation of FE model requires control for heteroskedasticity, which is done 
using the robust option (Table AP26). 
Table 5.6: Inflation Rate, Heteroskedasticity Test for FE Model 
xttest3 
 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model 
 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
 
chi2 (30)  =   18120.28 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
Source: Source: Author’s computation using STATA 
5.3.3. Inflation Rate: Empirical Models Comparison 
The relationship between actual and forecasted inflation rate has been modeled from four 
different perspectives.  The models outputs are summarized in Table 5.7. 
Due to a joint-significance of country-dummy variables, we gave preference to LSDV 
model over the POLS model. The Hausman Test indicated a non-zero correlation 
between the country specific effects and the forecasts of the inflation rate, according to 
which FE model is chosen over RE model. Consequently, the further efficiency and 
unbiasedness analysis of IMF projections will be performed on LSDV and FE models. 
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Table 5.7: Inflation Rate Models Comparison: POLS, LSDV, FE and RE 
 Pooled OLS LSDV FE RE 


















Source: Author’s computation using STATA 
5.3.4. Test for Efficiency of Inflation Rate IMF Projections 
The test for efficiency of the IMF projections for the inflation rate will be further 
performed using the Barrionuevo (1993) method. Accordingly, an efficient projection of 
inflation rate would be characterized by a zero mean of forecast error and a coefficient of 
the explanatory variable (forecasted inflation rate) of one. 
H0:              Projections are Efficient; 
 HA:              Projections are Inefficient. 
In order to test the joint-hypothesis of coefficients, a linear restriction is applied and an F-
test is used to compare the restricted and unrestricted models.  According to the test, 
which is applied on both LSDV model, as well we FE model (Table AP27 and Table 
AP28) we reject the null hypothesis under a 99% confidence level and conclude that the 
IMF projections for inflation rate, for the observed data sample, are inefficient. 
The inefficiency of IMF projections suggests that the mean of forecast errors is non-zero, 
but biased either upwards or downwards.  The unbiasedness test is further used to 
determine the forecast error, as well as the direction of the bias. 
5.3.5. Test for Unbiasedness of Inflation Rate IMF Projections 
The test for unbiasedness resides primarily on the analysis of two variables: forecasts 
error and model error.  While the model errors are slightly different for the LSDV model 
and FE model, the forecast error have no linkage to any specific model being a difference 
between the actual inflation rate and its forecast. 
As can be seen from Figure 5.6, out of 30 analyzed countries, only for 6 of them IMF on 
average overpredicted the inflation rate (Albania, Belarus, Poland, Norway, Switzerland 
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and Sweden), the other 24 countries were provided with underestimated projections 
(Table AP29 for detailed data). 
Figure 5.6: Inflation Rate Forecasts Errors per Country 
 
Source: Author’s computations in Excel 
The unbiasedness test is further used to find the value of the average forecast deviation. 
The test resides on the (5.3.7) model and analyses the relation between inflation forecast 
error as dependent variable and model error as independent variable (Tagaci & Kucur, 
2006). 
                 5.3.7 
After running the respective regression, a zero restriction for the constant term is imposed 
(    ). Respectively, the two hypotheses of the unbiasedness test are as follows: 
 H0:       - IMF predictions are unbiased;  
HA:       - IMF predictions are biased. 
The F-test rejects the null hypothesis under a 99% confidence level for both LSDV model 
(Table AP30) and FE model (Table AP31). We conclude that IMF projections for the 
inflation rate are neither efficient, nor unbiased. 
Moreover, according to both models (LSDV with country-clusters and robust FE) the 
deviation of the IMF forecasts for the inflation rate is on average by 0.8832% (absolute 
value). The positive sign of the inflation forecast error reveals that the actual inflation rate 
is higher than the forecasted one, such that we conclude on the presence of optimism bias 












5.3.6. Inflation Rate and Optimism Bias: Results Interpretation 
The optimism bias presence in the inflation rate forecasts provided by the IMF was tested 
by comparing the one-year-before forecasts and one-year-after actual inflation rate for a 
dataset comprising 30 countries for 22 periods. 
In order to assess the presence of a downward bias, four models were considered: pooled 
OLS, LSDV, RE model and FE model. After assessing a joint-significance of the 
country-dummy variables, the LSDV model (5.3.4) was preferred over the pooled OLS 
model. Similarly, the comparison between the random effects model and fixed effects 
model (5.3.6) was grounded on the Hausman Specification Test results that attested a 
non-zero correlation between the explanatory variable of the model and the individual 
specific error term. 
The test for efficiency showed that according to the estimates of the LSDV model, as 
well as the FE model, the IMF projections are inefficient. The inefficiency of inflation 
rate forecasts suggests a significant forecast error which, according to the test for 
unbiasedness encounters for a downward bias in IMF projection of 0.8832% in absolute 
value. Following these results, we find the empirical evidence of optimism bias presence 












Despite a wide range of empirical methods available to the economists to forecast the 
future, none of them provides consistently efficient and unbiased forecasts. 
In order to assess the biases which affect the accuracy of economic forecasts, we went 
through an analysis of the history of economic forecasting from the perspective of ancient 
Egypt, Old Testament and ancient Greece.  We found that the major difference between 
ancient and current forecasting tools consists in the approach type: ancients mostly relied 
on non-scientific forecasting methods (dreams, magic, religion, premonition, etc.), while 
nowadays economists accounts only for scientific approaches.  
Even though there are several aspects which modern economics have learnt from ancients 
(e.g. cyclicality), most of their forecasting methods are either forgotten, or ignored. 
Ancient Greece can be regarded as one of the most influential building blocks for 
nowadays forecasting tools.  Their contribution is mainly felt in quantification and 
requirements for proof. 
We have also analyzed the relationship between the accuracy of IMF forecasts and the 
level of countries development.  We considered GDP growth rate and inflation rate one-
year-before forecast and one–year-after actual value, for the period between 2000 and 
2010, and a set of 15 developed and 15 developing countries.  The analysis was based on  
six forecasting evaluation measures: MSE, RMSE, MAD, MAPE, LAD and MeAE. 
According to estimation results, we found that developed countries are provided with a 
set of more accurate data as compared to developing countries. 
In this sense, we have also introduced the concept of misleading data trap.  Accordingly, 
we assume that it is not only the volatility of a poor economy the cause of weakly 
captured economic data (i.e. inaccurate economic forecasts), but the inaccurate economic 
forecasts are a cause of economic volatility as such, given that the vast majority of socio-
economic policies are based on erroneous economic forecasts.  The test of this cross-
correlation can serve as a subject for further analyses. 
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Additionally, among several biases which directly or indirectly affect the accuracy of 
economic predictions, we have empirically tested the implication of optimistic bias on the 
GDP growth rate forecasts and inflation rate forecasts provided by IMF.  We have based 
our analysis on four econometric models for panel data, out of which LSDV with 
country-clusters and RE models proved to be the most reliable for the GDP growth rate 
data, while LSDV with country-clusters and robust FE proved to explain the best the data 
for inflation rate. 
Based on the respective models we have tested the efficiency and unbiasedness of the 
IMF forecasts and found that neither for GDP growth rate, nor for inflation rate, IMF 
provides efficient and unbiased forecasts.  We have specifically determined that GDP 
growth rate forecasts are biased upwards with, on average, 0.258% in absolute value for 
the given dataset. The inflation rate proved to be biased downwards, such that on average 
the underestimation of the actual data is of 0.8832% in absolute value. 
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Table AP1: GDP Growth Rate, POLS Model 
reg act_gdp fc_gdp d_20002-d_20102 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     660 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 22,   637) =   41.81 
       Model |  7489.80114    22  340.445506           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |   5186.9201   637  8.14273171           R-squared     =  0.5908 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5767 
       Total |  12676.7212   659  19.2362993           Root MSE      =  2.8535 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     act_gdp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      fc_gdp |   .9247622   .0641996    14.40   0.000     .7986938    1.050831 
     d_20002 |   .3172975   .7368201     0.43   0.667    -1.129593    1.764188 
     d_20011 |  -1.785647   .7375869    -2.42   0.016    -3.234043   -.3372517 
     d_20012 |  -1.951425   .7384378    -2.64   0.008    -3.401492   -.5013587 
     d_20021 |  -1.669592   .7377712    -2.26   0.024     -3.11835   -.2208343 
     d_20022 |  -1.227581   .7369627    -1.67   0.096    -2.674751    .2195886 
     d_20031 |  -1.278918   .7377568    -1.73   0.083    -2.727647    .1698115 
     d_20032 |  -.8375496   .7372015    -1.14   0.256    -2.285189    .6100893 
     d_20041 |   .3815203   .7370879     0.52   0.605    -1.065896    1.828936 
     d_20042 |   .5293361   .7369674     0.72   0.473    -.9178432    1.976515 
     d_20051 |  -.2786259   .7372689    -0.38   0.706    -1.726397    1.169145 
     d_20052 |  -.4221465   .7380762    -0.57   0.568    -1.871503     1.02721 
     d_20061 |   .6142376    .737609     0.83   0.405    -.8342016    2.062677 
     d_20062 |   .7479677   .7373752     1.01   0.311    -.7000123    2.195948 
     d_20071 |   .3906916   .7376604     0.53   0.597    -1.057849    1.839232 
     d_20072 |   .2197011   .7380385     0.30   0.766    -1.229581    1.668984 
     d_20081 |  -2.834289   .7384839    -3.84   0.000    -4.284447   -1.384132 
     d_20082 |  -3.038737   .7395763    -4.11   0.000    -4.491039   -1.586435 
     d_20091 |  -10.15232   .7368134   -13.78   0.000     -11.5992   -8.705446 
     d_20092 |  -9.067348   .7398534   -12.26   0.000    -10.52019   -7.614501 
     d_20101 |    1.47501   .7662859     1.92   0.055     -.029742    2.979762 
     d_20102 |   1.139886   .7597173     1.50   0.134    -.3519669    2.631739 
       _cons |   1.299336   .5616824     2.31   0.021     .1963631    2.402309 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 






Table AP2: GDP Growth Rate, POLS Model with Robust Errors 
reg act_gdp fc_gdp d_20002-d_20102, robust 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     660 
                                                       F( 22,   637) =   24.10 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.5908 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.8535 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     act_gdp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      fc_gdp |   .9247622    .088095    10.50   0.000     .7517705    1.097754 
     d_20002 |   .3172975   .5495968     0.58   0.564     -.761943    1.396538 
     d_20011 |  -1.785647   .6389006    -2.79   0.005    -3.040253   -.5310415 
     d_20012 |  -1.951425   .6860705    -2.84   0.005    -3.298659    -.604192 
     d_20021 |  -1.669592   .5466413    -3.05   0.002    -2.743029   -.5961551 
     d_20022 |  -1.227581   .5407523    -2.27   0.024    -2.289454   -.1657088 
     d_20031 |  -1.278918   .6544685    -1.95   0.051    -2.564094    .0062586 
     d_20032 |  -.8375496   .6494549    -1.29   0.198    -2.112881    .4377818 
     d_20041 |   .3815203   .5727648     0.67   0.506    -.7432152    1.506256 
     d_20042 |   .5293361   .5467633     0.97   0.333    -.5443402    1.603012 
     d_20051 |  -.2786259    .591005    -0.47   0.637     -1.43918    .8819278 
     d_20052 |  -.4221465   .5833488    -0.72   0.470    -1.567666    .7233727 
     d_20061 |   .6142376   .5467959     1.12   0.262    -.4595028    1.687978 
     d_20062 |   .7479677   .5434147     1.38   0.169     -.319133    1.815068 
     d_20071 |   .3906916   .5613458     0.70   0.487    -.7116204    1.493003 
     d_20072 |   .2197011   .5447962     0.40   0.687    -.8501125    1.289515 
     d_20081 |  -2.834289   .7221616    -3.92   0.000    -4.252395   -1.416184 
     d_20082 |  -3.038737   .6586008    -4.61   0.000    -4.332028   -1.745446 
     d_20091 |  -10.15232   1.116275    -9.09   0.000    -12.34435   -7.960299 
     d_20092 |  -9.067348   1.051036    -8.63   0.000    -11.13126   -7.003433 
     d_20101 |    1.47501   .6180553     2.39   0.017     .2613377    2.688682 
     d_20102 |   1.139886   .6132592     1.86   0.064     -.064368     2.34414 
       _cons |   1.299336   .5057917     2.57   0.010     .3061154    2.292557 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------  





Table AP3: GDP Growth Rate, VIF Test for POLS model 
vif 
 
Variable |       VIF       1/VIF 
-------------+---------------------- 
d_20101 |      2.07    0.484251 
d_20102 |      2.03    0.492661 
d_20092 |      1.93    0.519471 
d_20082 |      1.92    0.519860 
d_20081 |      1.92    0.521399 
d_20012 |      1.92    0.521464 
d_20052 |      1.92    0.521975 
d_20072 |      1.92    0.522029 
d_20021 |      1.91    0.522407 
d_20031 |      1.91    0.522427 
d_20071 |      1.91    0.522564 
d_20061 |      1.91    0.522637 
d_20011 |      1.91    0.522668 
d_20062 |      1.91    0.522968 
d_20051 |      1.91    0.523119 
d_20032 |      1.91    0.523215 
d_20041 |      1.91    0.523376 
d_20042 |      1.91    0.523547 
d_20022 |      1.91    0.523554 
d_20002 |      1.91    0.523756 
d_20091 |      1.91    0.523766 
fc_gdp |      1.39    0.720218 
-------------+---------------------- 
Mean VIF |      1.90 





Table AP4: GDP Growth Rate, LSDV Model with Year & Country-Dummies 
reg act_gdp fc_gdp d_20002-d_20102 d_country2-d_country30 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     660 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 51,   608) =   22.97 
       Model |  8344.85108    51  163.624531           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  4331.87016   608  7.12478646           R-squared     =  0.6583 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6296 
       Total |  12676.7212   659  19.2362993           Root MSE      =  2.6692 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     act_gdp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      fc_gdp |   .4629928   .0925396     5.00   0.000     .2812569    .6447288 
     d_20002 |   .2638861   .6892752     0.38   0.702    -1.089763    1.617535 
     d_20011 |  -1.537985   .6909769    -2.23   0.026    -2.894976    -.180994 
     d_20012 |  -1.596017   .6928627    -2.30   0.022    -2.956711   -.2353222 
     d_20021 |  -1.394993   .6913856    -2.02   0.044    -2.752787   -.0371993 
     d_20022 |  -1.110446   .6895918    -1.61   0.108    -2.464717     .243825 
     d_20031 |   -1.00632   .6913538    -1.46   0.146    -2.364051    .3514113 
     d_20032 |  -.6588449    .690122    -0.95   0.340    -2.014157    .6964672 
     d_20041 |    .534058   .6898697     0.77   0.439    -.8207587    1.888875 
     d_20042 |   .6480108   .6896023     0.94   0.348    -.7062808    2.002303 
     d_20051 |  -.0860681   .6902716    -0.12   0.901    -1.441674    1.269538 
     d_20052 |  -.1079895   .6920617    -0.16   0.876    -1.467111    1.251132 
     d_20061 |   .8652862    .691026     1.25   0.211    -.4918014    2.222374 
     d_20062 |   .9605355   .6905074     1.39   0.165    -.3955335    2.316605 
     d_20071 |   .6494363     .69114     0.94   0.348    -.7078752    2.006748 
     d_20072 |   .5292405   .6919782     0.76   0.445     -.829717    1.888198 
     d_20081 |  -2.473955   .6929649    -3.57   0.000    -3.834851    -1.11306 
     d_20082 |  -2.576814   .6953812    -3.71   0.000    -3.942455   -1.211173 
     d_20091 |  -10.10398   .6892602   -14.66   0.000     -11.4576   -8.750356 
     d_20092 |  -9.551682   .6959933   -13.72   0.000    -10.91853    -8.18484 
     d_20101 |  -.0396551   .7530761    -0.05   0.958    -1.518601    1.439291 
     d_20102 |  -.1926416    .739119    -0.26   0.794    -1.644178    1.258894 
  d_country2 |   2.498852   .8056674     3.10   0.002     .9166234    4.081081 
  d_country3 |  -2.146118   .8876591    -2.42   0.016    -3.889368   -.4028682 
  d_country4 |   2.733774   .8405755     3.25   0.001     1.082991    4.384558 
  d_country5 |  -2.050865   .8938908    -2.29   0.022    -3.806354   -.2953768 
  d_country6 |  -.8628961   .8195938    -1.05   0.293    -2.472475    .7466824 
  d_country7 |  -2.356991   .9001786    -2.62   0.009    -4.124828   -.5891543 
  d_country8 |  -1.061014    .814841    -1.30   0.193    -2.661258     .539231 
  d_country9 |  -1.883563   .8684615    -2.17   0.030    -3.589111   -.1780146 
 d_country10 |  -2.416698   .8873842    -2.72   0.007    -4.159409   -.6739881 
 d_country11 |   .7304478    .811541     0.90   0.368    -.8633159    2.324211 
 d_country12 |  -2.428313   .9047863    -2.68   0.007    -4.205199   -.6514277 
 d_country13 |  -2.059325   .8449653    -2.44   0.015     -3.71873   -.3999203 
 d_country14 |  -2.984928    .906037    -3.29   0.001     -4.76427   -1.205586 
 d_country15 |  -.8345055   .8164052    -1.02   0.307    -2.437822    .7688109 
 d_country16 |  -.7939792   .8207617    -0.97   0.334    -2.405851    .8178929 
 d_country17 |  -1.240879   .8383732    -1.48   0.139    -2.887338    .4055801 
 d_country18 |  -.0123265   .8253505    -0.01   0.988     -1.63321    1.608557 
 d_country19 |   -2.44556   .8895241    -2.75   0.006    -4.192472   -.6986467 
 d_country20 |  -2.108367   .8823631    -2.39   0.017    -3.841217   -.3755178 
 d_country21 |  -.7960777   .8268641    -0.96   0.336    -2.419934    .8277787 
 d_country22 |  -2.879435   .8984928    -3.20   0.001    -4.643961   -1.114909 
 d_country23 |  -.8389362   .8251347    -1.02   0.310    -2.459396    .7815238 
 d_country24 |   .2814541    .823246     0.34   0.733    -1.335297    1.898205 
 d_country25 |  -1.821837   .8723152    -2.09   0.037    -3.534954   -.1087209 
 d_country26 |  -1.757549   .8791998    -2.00   0.046    -3.484186    -.030912 
 d_country27 |  -1.952212   .9065205    -2.15   0.032    -3.732504   -.1719207 
 d_country28 |  -.7202148   .8183934    -0.88   0.379    -2.327436    .8870064 
 d_country29 |   .0641692   .8390433     0.08   0.939    -1.583606    1.711944 
 d_country30 |  -2.113117   .8880658    -2.38   0.018    -3.857166   -.3690682 





. test d_country2 d_country3 d_country4 d_country5 d_country6 d_country7 
d_country8 d_country9 d_country10 d_country11 d_country12 d_country13 
d_country14 d_country15 d_country16 d_country17 d_country18 d_country19 
d_country20 d_country21 d_country22 d_country23 d_country24 d_country25 
d_country26 d_country27 d_country28 d_country29 d_country30 
 
 ( 1)  d_country2 = 0 
 ( 2)  d_country3 = 0 
 ( 3)  d_country4 = 0 
 ( 4)  d_country5 = 0 
 ( 5)  d_country6 = 0 
 ( 6)  d_country7 = 0 
 ( 7)  d_country8 = 0 
 ( 8)  d_country9 = 0 
 ( 9)  d_country10 = 0 
 (10)  d_country11 = 0 
 (11)  d_country12 = 0 
 (12)  d_country13 = 0 
 (13)  d_country14 = 0 
 (14)  d_country15 = 0 
 (15)  d_country16 = 0 
 (16)  d_country17 = 0 
 (17)  d_country18 = 0 
 (18)  d_country19 = 0 
 (19)  d_country20 = 0 
 (20)  d_country21 = 0 
 (21)  d_country22 = 0 
 (22)  d_country23 = 0 
 (23)  d_country24 = 0 
 (24)  d_country25 = 0 
 (25)  d_country26 = 0 
 (26)  d_country27 = 0 
 (27)  d_country28 = 0 
 (28)  d_country29 = 0 
 (29)  d_country30 = 0 
 
       F( 29,   608) =    4.14 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 










Table AP5: GDP Growth Rate, VIF Test for LSDV model 
vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
      fc_gdp |      3.30    0.303302 
 d_country27 |      2.45    0.407678 
 d_country14 |      2.45    0.408113 
 d_country12 |      2.44    0.409242 
  d_country7 |      2.42    0.413442 
 d_country22 |      2.41    0.414995 
  d_country5 |      2.39    0.419279 
 d_country19 |      2.36    0.423406 
 d_country30 |      2.35    0.424798 
  d_country3 |      2.35    0.425187 
 d_country10 |      2.35    0.425451 
 d_country20 |      2.32    0.430306 
 d_country26 |      2.31    0.433408 
     d_20101 |      2.28    0.438709 
 d_country25 |      2.27    0.440277 
  d_country9 |      2.25    0.444193 
     d_20102 |      2.20    0.455434 
 d_country13 |      2.13    0.469240 
  d_country4 |      2.11    0.474154 
 d_country29 |      2.10    0.475887 
 d_country17 |      2.10    0.476648 
 d_country21 |      2.04    0.490009 
 d_country18 |      2.03    0.491808 
 d_country23 |      2.03    0.492065 
 d_country24 |      2.02    0.494326 
 d_country16 |      2.01    0.497323 
  d_country6 |      2.01    0.498741 
 d_country28 |      2.00    0.500205 
 d_country15 |      1.99    0.502645 
  d_country8 |      1.98    0.504576 
 d_country11 |      1.97    0.508688 
     d_20092 |      1.95    0.513622 
     d_20082 |      1.94    0.514527 
  d_country2 |      1.94    0.516132 
     d_20081 |      1.93    0.518121 
     d_20012 |      1.93    0.518274 
     d_20052 |      1.93    0.519475 
     d_20072 |      1.92    0.519600 
     d_20021 |      1.92    0.520491 
     d_20031 |      1.92    0.520539 
     d_20071 |      1.92    0.520861 
     d_20061 |      1.92    0.521033 
     d_20011 |      1.92    0.521107 
     d_20062 |      1.92    0.521816 
     d_20051 |      1.92    0.522172 
     d_20032 |      1.91    0.522399 
     d_20041 |      1.91    0.522781 
     d_20042 |      1.91    0.523186 
     d_20022 |      1.91    0.523203 
     d_20002 |      1.91    0.523683 
     d_20091 |      1.91    0.523706 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      2.11 




Table AP6: GDP Growth Rate, LSDV Model with Country-Clusters 
reg act_gdp fc_gdp d_country2-d_country30 d_20002-d_20102, cluster(country) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     660 
                                                       F( 21,    29) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6583 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.6692 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 30 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     act_gdp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      fc_gdp |   .4629928   .2428202     1.91   0.067    -.0336303     .959616 
  d_country2 |   2.498852   .0979007    25.52   0.000     2.298623    2.699082 
  d_country3 |  -2.146118   .9826052    -2.18   0.037    -4.155772   -.1364648 
  d_country4 |   2.733774   .6365974     4.29   0.000     1.431786    4.035762 
  d_country5 |  -2.050865   1.020761    -2.01   0.054    -4.138556    .0368257 
  d_country6 |  -.8628961   .4067239    -2.12   0.043     -1.69474   -.0310523 
  d_country7 |  -2.356991   1.058122    -2.23   0.034    -4.521094   -.1928879 
  d_country8 |  -1.061014   .3345732    -3.17   0.004    -1.745293   -.3767345 
  d_country9 |  -1.883563   .8563829    -2.20   0.036    -3.635063   -.1320634 
 d_country10 |  -2.416698   .9808945    -2.46   0.020    -4.422853   -.4105439 
 d_country11 |   .7304478    .273835     2.67   0.012     .1703923    1.290503 
 d_country12 |  -2.428313   1.084844    -2.24   0.033    -4.647068   -.2095592 
 d_country13 |  -2.059325   .6754266    -3.05   0.005    -3.440728   -.6779227 
 d_country14 |  -2.984928   1.092007    -2.73   0.011    -5.218333   -.7515233 
 d_country15 |  -.8345055   .3598706    -2.32   0.028    -1.570524   -.0984874 
 d_country16 |  -.7939792   .4226286    -1.88   0.070    -1.658352    .0703934 
 d_country17 |  -1.240879   .6162778    -2.01   0.053    -2.501308    .0195509 
 d_country18 |  -.0123265   .4802322    -0.03   0.980    -.9945116    .9698587 
 d_country19 |   -2.44556   .9941502    -2.46   0.020    -4.478825    -.412294 
 d_country20 |  -2.108367   .9491954    -2.22   0.034     -4.04969   -.1670447 
 d_country21 |  -.7960777   .4978367    -1.60   0.121    -1.814268    .2221127 
 d_country22 |  -2.879435   1.048211    -2.75   0.010    -5.023267   -.7356031 
 d_country23 |  -.8389362   .4776716    -1.76   0.090    -1.815884    .1380119 
 d_country24 |   .2814541   .4546809     0.62   0.541    -.6484728    1.211381 
 d_country25 |  -1.821837   .8829386    -2.06   0.048     -3.62765   -.0160254 
 d_country26 |  -1.757549   .9287654    -1.89   0.068    -3.657088    .1419894 
 d_country27 |  -1.952212   1.094766    -1.78   0.085     -4.19126     .286836 
 d_country28 |  -.7202148   .3897265    -1.85   0.075    -1.517295    .0768654 
 d_country29 |   .0641692   .6225249     0.10   0.919    -1.209037    1.337375 
 d_country30 |  -2.113117   .9851328    -2.15   0.040     -4.12794   -.0982943 
     d_20002 |   .2638861   .1100094     2.40   0.023     .0388917    .4888806 
     d_20011 |  -1.537985   .6164731    -2.49   0.019    -2.798814    -.277156 
     d_20012 |  -1.596017   .7307712    -2.18   0.037    -3.090612   -.1014219 
     d_20021 |  -1.394993   .5886242    -2.37   0.025    -2.598865   -.1911215 
     d_20022 |  -1.110446   .5675764    -1.96   0.060     -2.27127    .0503781 
     d_20031 |   -1.00632   .6823094    -1.47   0.151    -2.401799    .3891593 
     d_20032 |  -.6588449   .7095361    -0.93   0.361    -2.110009    .7923193 
     d_20041 |    .534058   .5238923     1.02   0.316     -.537422    1.605538 
     d_20042 |   .6480108   .4766593     1.36   0.184    -.3268669    1.622889 
     d_20051 |  -.0860681   .5656937    -0.15   0.880    -1.243042    1.070905 
     d_20052 |  -.1079895   .5961983    -0.18   0.858    -1.327352    1.111373 
     d_20061 |   .8652862   .5275269     1.64   0.112    -.2136275      1.9442 
     d_20062 |   .9605355   .5152916     1.86   0.072    -.0933542    2.014425 
     d_20071 |   .6494363   .6069677     1.07   0.293     -.591952    1.890825 
     d_20072 |   .5292405   .6131322     0.86   0.395    -.7247558    1.783237 
     d_20081 |  -2.473955   .7801038    -3.17   0.004    -4.069447    -.878464 
     d_20082 |  -2.576814   .7590349    -3.39   0.002    -4.129215   -1.024413 
     d_20091 |  -10.10398   1.089701    -9.27   0.000    -12.33266   -7.875287 
     d_20092 |  -9.551682   1.056865    -9.04   0.000    -11.71321   -7.390151 
     d_20101 |  -.0396551   .8436143    -0.05   0.963     -1.76504     1.68573 
     d_20102 |  -.1926416   .8122441    -0.24   0.814    -1.853867    1.468584 
       _cons |   3.951068   1.480676     2.67   0.012     .9227466     6.97939 
Source: Author’s computations in STATA 
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Table AP7: GDP Growth Rate, RE Model 
xtreg act_gdp fc_gdp d_20002-d_20102, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       660 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        30 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5746                         Obs per group: min =        22 
       between = 0.7682                                        avg =      22.0 
       overall = 0.5858                                        max =        22 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(22)      =    874.51 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     act_gdp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      fc_gdp |   .7288486    .076958     9.47   0.000     .5780137    .8796835 
     d_20002 |   .2946368   .7019867     0.42   0.675    -1.081232    1.670505 
     d_20011 |  -1.680572   .7031428    -2.39   0.017    -3.058707    -.302438 
     d_20012 |  -1.800637    .704425    -2.56   0.011    -3.181285   -.4199896 
     d_20021 |  -1.553089   .7034206    -2.21   0.027    -2.931768   -.1744097 
     d_20022 |  -1.177885   .7022017    -1.68   0.093    -2.554175    .1984054 
     d_20031 |  -1.163264   .7033989    -1.65   0.098      -2.5419     .215373 
     d_20032 |  -.7617311   .7025618    -1.08   0.278    -2.138727    .6152648 
     d_20041 |    .446237   .7023905     0.64   0.525     -.930423    1.822897 
     d_20042 |   .5796859   .7022089     0.83   0.409    -.7966182     1.95599 
     d_20051 |  -.1969299   .7026635    -0.28   0.779    -1.574125    1.180265 
     d_20052 |    -.28886   .7038802    -0.41   0.682     -1.66844     1.09072 
     d_20061 |   .7207492   .7031761     1.02   0.305    -.6574506    2.098949 
     d_20062 |   .8381533   .7028237     1.19   0.233    -.5393558    2.215662 
     d_20071 |   .5004685   .7032536     0.71   0.477    -.8778833     1.87882 
     d_20072 |   .3510285   .7038234     0.50   0.618     -1.02844    1.730497 
     d_20081 |  -2.681412   .7044945    -3.81   0.000    -4.062195   -1.300628 
     d_20082 |  -2.842758   .7061392    -4.03   0.000    -4.226766   -1.458751 
     d_20091 |  -10.13181   .7019765   -14.43   0.000    -11.50766   -8.755962 
     d_20092 |  -9.272835   .7065562   -13.12   0.000    -10.65766    -7.88801 
     d_20101 |   .8323872   .7459412     1.12   0.264    -.6296307    2.294405 
     d_20102 |   .5745383   .7362232     0.78   0.435    -.8684326    2.017509 
       _cons |   1.939908   .5738154     3.38   0.001     .8152506    3.064566 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .75279761 
     sigma_e |  2.6692296 
         rho |  .07367938   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 





Table AP8: GDP Growth Rate, FE Model 
xtreg act_gdp fc_gdp d_20002-d_20102, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       660 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        30 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5799                         Obs per group: min =        22 
       between = 0.7682                                        avg =      22.0 
       overall = 0.5599                                        max =        22 
 
                                                F(22,608)          =     38.14 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.1499                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     act_gdp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      fc_gdp |   .4629928   .0925396     5.00   0.000     .2812569    .6447288 
     d_20002 |   .2638861   .6892752     0.38   0.702    -1.089763    1.617535 
     d_20011 |  -1.537985   .6909769    -2.23   0.026    -2.894976    -.180994 
     d_20012 |  -1.596017   .6928627    -2.30   0.022    -2.956711   -.2353222 
     d_20021 |  -1.394993   .6913856    -2.02   0.044    -2.752787   -.0371993 
     d_20022 |  -1.110446   .6895918    -1.61   0.108    -2.464717     .243825 
     d_20031 |   -1.00632   .6913538    -1.46   0.146    -2.364051    .3514113 
     d_20032 |  -.6588449    .690122    -0.95   0.340    -2.014157    .6964672 
     d_20041 |    .534058   .6898697     0.77   0.439    -.8207587    1.888875 
     d_20042 |   .6480108   .6896023     0.94   0.348    -.7062808    2.002303 
     d_20051 |  -.0860681   .6902716    -0.12   0.901    -1.441674    1.269538 
     d_20052 |  -.1079895   .6920617    -0.16   0.876    -1.467111    1.251132 
     d_20061 |   .8652862    .691026     1.25   0.211    -.4918014    2.222374 
     d_20062 |   .9605355   .6905074     1.39   0.165    -.3955335    2.316605 
     d_20071 |   .6494363     .69114     0.94   0.348    -.7078752    2.006748 
     d_20072 |   .5292405   .6919782     0.76   0.445     -.829717    1.888198 
     d_20081 |  -2.473955   .6929649    -3.57   0.000    -3.834851    -1.11306 
     d_20082 |  -2.576814   .6953812    -3.71   0.000    -3.942455   -1.211173 
     d_20091 |  -10.10398   .6892602   -14.66   0.000     -11.4576   -8.750356 
     d_20092 |  -9.551682   .6959933   -13.72   0.000    -10.91853    -8.18484 
     d_20101 |  -.0396551   .7530761    -0.05   0.958    -1.518601    1.439291 
     d_20102 |  -.1926416    .739119    -0.26   0.794    -1.644178    1.258894 
       _cons |   2.809168   .5736232     4.90   0.000     1.682644    3.935691 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.4143884 
     sigma_e |  2.6692296 
         rho |  .21922553   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(29, 608) =     4.14             Prob > F = 0.0000 







Table AP9: GDP Growth Rate, Test for Fixed Effects 
. test d_20002 d_20011 d_20012 d_20021 d_20022 d_20031 d_20032 d_20041 d_20042 
d_20051 d_20052 d_20061 d_20062 d_20071 d_20072 d_20081 d_20082 d_20091 d_20092 
d_20101 d_20102 
 
 ( 1)  d_20002 = 0 
 ( 2)  d_20011 = 0 
 ( 3)  d_20012 = 0 
 ( 4)  d_20021 = 0 
 ( 5)  d_20022 = 0 
 ( 6)  d_20031 = 0 
 ( 7)  d_20032 = 0 
 ( 8)  d_20041 = 0 
 ( 9)  d_20042 = 0 
 (10)  d_20051 = 0 
 (11)  d_20052 = 0 
 (12)  d_20061 = 0 
 (13)  d_20062 = 0 
 (14)  d_20071 = 0 
 (15)  d_20072 = 0 
 (16)  d_20081 = 0 
 (17)  d_20082 = 0 
 (18)  d_20091 = 0 
 (19)  d_20092 = 0 
 (20)  d_20101 = 0 
 (21)  d_20102 = 0 
 
       F( 21,   608) =   36.64 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 










Table AP10: GDP Growth Rate, Hausman Specification Test 
hausman fixed random 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |     fixed        random       Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      fc_gdp |    .4629928     .7288486       -.2658558         .051391 
     d_20002 |    .2638861     .2946368       -.0307507               . 
     d_20011 |   -1.537985    -1.680572        .1425873               . 
     d_20012 |   -1.596017    -1.800637        .2046203               . 
     d_20021 |   -1.394993    -1.553089        .1580956               . 
     d_20022 |   -1.110446    -1.177885        .0674387               . 
     d_20031 |    -1.00632    -1.163264        .1569435               . 
     d_20032 |   -.6588449    -.7617311        .1028862               . 
     d_20041 |     .534058      .446237         .087821               . 
     d_20042 |    .6480108     .5796859        .0683249               . 
     d_20051 |   -.0860681    -.1969299        .1108619               . 
     d_20052 |   -.1079895      -.28886        .1808705               . 
     d_20061 |    .8652862     .7207492        .1445369               . 
     d_20062 |    .9605355     .8381533        .1223823               . 
     d_20071 |    .6494363     .5004685        .1489678               . 
     d_20072 |    .5292405     .3510285         .178212               . 
     d_20081 |   -2.473955    -2.681412        .2074561               . 
     d_20082 |   -2.576814    -2.842758        .2659444               . 
     d_20091 |   -10.10398    -10.13181        .0278351               . 
     d_20092 |   -9.551682    -9.272835       -.2788472               . 
     d_20101 |   -.0396551     .8323872       -.8720423        .1034181 
     d_20102 |   -.1926416     .5745383         -.76718        .0653627 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                 chi2(22) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       26.76 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.2204 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 






Table AP11: GDP Growth Rate, LSDV model: Test for Efficiency 
Restriction set 
 1: b[const] = 0 
 2: b[Fc_GDP] = 1 
 
Test statistic: F(2, 608) = 5.3478, with p-value = 0.00498509 
Restricted estimates: 
 
                coefficient   std. error    t-ratio     p-value   
  --------------------------------------------------------------- 
  const          0.000000      0.000000     NA         NA         
  Fc_GDP         1.00000       0.000000     NA         NA         
  d_2000_2       0.614537      0.626401      0.9811     0.3270    
  d_2001_1      -1.53746       0.626401     -2.454      0.0144    ** 
  d_2001_2      -1.72080       0.626401     -2.747      0.0062    *** 
  d_2002_1      -1.42580       0.626401     -2.276      0.0232    ** 
  d_2002_2      -0.958130      0.626401     -1.530      0.1266    
  d_2003_1      -1.03480       0.626401     -1.652      0.0991    * 
  d_2003_2      -0.578130      0.626401     -0.9229     0.3564    
  d_2004_1       0.645203      0.626401      1.030      0.3034    
  d_2004_2       0.798537      0.626401      1.275      0.2029    
  d_2005_1      -0.0214634     0.626401     -0.03426    0.9727    
  d_2005_2      -0.184797      0.626401     -0.2950     0.7681    
  d_2006_1       0.861870      0.626401      1.376      0.1694    
  d_2006_2       1.00187       0.626401      1.599      0.1102    
  d_2007_1       0.637070      0.626401      1.017      0.3095    
  d_2007_2       0.457803      0.626401      0.7308     0.4652    
  d_2008_1      -2.60446       0.626401     -4.158      3.67e-05  *** 
  d_2008_2      -2.82546       0.626401     -4.511      7.75e-06  *** 
  d_2009_1      -9.87166       0.626401    -15.76       3.42e-047 *** 
  d_2009_2      -8.69990       0.626401    -13.89       2.64e-038 *** 
  d_2010_1       2.01034       0.626401      3.209      0.0014    *** 
  d_2010_2       1.64554       0.626401      2.627      0.0088    *** 
  d_country2     3.10882       0.693942      4.480      8.92e-06  *** 
  d_country3     0.420414      0.693942      0.6058     0.5449    
  d_country4     4.53510       0.693942      6.535      1.34e-010 *** 
  d_country5     0.600050      0.693942      0.8647     0.3875    
  d_country6     0.430050      0.693942      0.6197     0.5357    
  d_country7     0.376550      0.693942      0.5426     0.5876    
  d_country8     0.0723681     0.693942      0.1043     0.9170    
  d_country9     0.403823      0.693942      0.5819     0.5608    
  d_country10    0.146050      0.693942      0.2105     0.8334    
  d_country11    1.72950       0.693942      2.492      0.0130    ** 
  d_country12    0.364323      0.693942      0.5250     0.5998    
  d_country13   -0.172132      0.693942     -0.2480     0.8042    
  d_country14   -0.176450      0.693942     -0.2543     0.7994    
  d_country15    0.354823      0.693942      0.5113     0.6093    
  d_country16    0.534141      0.693942      0.7697     0.4418    
  d_country17    0.515504      0.693942      0.7429     0.4579    
  d_country18    1.44319       0.693942      2.080      0.0380    ** 
  d_country19    0.146504      0.693942      0.2111     0.8329    
  d_country20    0.384277      0.693942      0.5538     0.5799    
  d_country21    0.698368      0.693942      1.006      0.3146    
  d_country22   -0.167814      0.693942     -0.2418     0.8090    
  d_country23    0.610914      0.693942      0.8804     0.3790    
  d_country24    1.68046       0.693942      2.422      0.0157    ** 
  d_country25    0.524277      0.693942      0.7555     0.4502    
  d_country26    0.689914      0.693942      0.9942     0.3205    
  d_country27    0.862368      0.693942      1.243      0.2145    
  d_country28    0.535141      0.693942      0.7712     0.4409    
  d_country29    1.83437       0.693942      2.643      0.0084    *** 
  d_country30    0.459004      0.693942      0.6614     0.5086    
 
  Standard error of the regression = 2.73939 




Table AP12: GDP Growth Rate, RE Model: Test for Efficiency 
Restriction set 
 1: b[const] = 0 
 2: b[Fc_GDP] = 1 
 
Test statistic: F(2, 637) = 8.29302, with p-value = 0.000278277 





Table AP13: GDP Growth Rate, Forecast Errors per country 
Country Average Error  Sum of Errors Maximum Error Minimum Error 
 
   
  
   
  
 
   
  
   
 
                  
Albania -0.6424 -14.134 1.500 -3.300 
Armenia 2.0729 45.604 7.900 -22.423 
Austria -0.6155 -13.541 1.825 -5.283 
Belarus 3.4991 76.982 7.800 -7.794 
Belgium -0.4358 -9.589 2.065 -4.182 
Bulgaria -0.6058 -13.329 2.650 -9.832 
Denmark -0.6593 -14.506 1.681 -5.606 
Estonia -0.9635 -21.198 5.900 -17.795 
Finland -0.6321 -13.906 4.360 -9.871 
France -0.8899 -19.577 1.074 -3.428 
Georgia 0.6936 15.259 7.400 -13.000 
Germany -0.6716 -14.775 4.504 -6.010 
Hungary -1.2080 -26.577 2.076 -8.831 
Italy -1.2124 -26.672 1.685 -5.289 
Latvia -0.6811 -14.984 5.700 -18.469 
Lithuania -0.5018 -11.039 5.322 -20.461 
Luxembourg -0.5204 -11.449 4.100 -7.408 
Moldova 0.4072 8.960 6.900 -14.490 
Netherlands -0.8894 -19.567 2.408 -5.535 
Norway -0.6516 -14.336 0.916 -3.862 
Poland -0.3375 -7.426 2.720 -4.500 
Portugal -1.2037 -26.482 1.898 -4.078 
Romania -0.4250 -9.350 3.300 -11.935 
Russia 0.6445 14.180 7.470 -14.200 
Spain -0.5116 -11.256 0.900 -5.299 
Sweden -0.3460 -7.612 5.366 -6.544 
Switzerland -0.1735 -3.818 2.882 -3.100 
Turkey -0.5007 -11.017 6.700 -12.910 
UK -0.5769 -12.692 1.647 -6.530 
Ukraine 0.7984 17.566 8.100 -19.259 
TOTAL -0.2580 -170.281 - - 





Table AP14: GDP Growth Rate, LSDV Model: Test for Unbiasedness  
Pooled OLS, using 660 observations 
Included 30 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 22 
Dependent variable: Fc_Error_GDP 
 
                   coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value  
  --------------------------------------------------------------- 
  const             -0.258002    0.121616     -2.121    0.0343    ** 
  GDP_resid_LSDV     1.00000     0.0474706    21.07     1.09e-075 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  -0.258002   S.D. dependent var   4.039833 
Sum squared resid    6423.177   S.E. of regression   3.124367 
R-squared            0.402776   Adjusted R-squared   0.401868 
F(1, 658)            443.7633   P-value(F)           1.09e-75 
Log-likelihood      -1687.391   Akaike criterion     3378.782 
Schwarz criterion    3387.766   Hannan-Quinn         3382.264 
rho                  0.551098   Durbin-Watson        0.881838 
 
  --------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Restriction: 
 b[const] = 0 
 




                   coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value   
  ---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  const             0.000000     0.000000      NA       NA         
  GDP_resid_LSDV    1.00000      0.0475965     21.01     2.09e-075 *** 
 
  Standard error of the regression = 3.13265 





Table AP15: GDP Growth Rate, RE Model: Test for Unbiasedness 
Pooled OLS, using 660 observations 
Included 30 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 22 
Dependent variable: Fc_Error_GDP 
 
                 coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value  
  ------------------------------------------------------------- 
  const           -0.258002    0.114566     -2.252    0.0247    ** 
  Resid_GDP_RE     0.980058    0.0405716    24.16     8.73e-093 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  -0.258002   S.D. dependent var   4.039833 
Sum squared resid    5700.105   S.E. of regression   2.943259 
R-squared            0.470006   Adjusted R-squared   0.469201 
F(1, 658)            583.5246   P-value(F)           8.73e-93 
Log-likelihood      -1647.979   Akaike criterion     3299.959 
Schwarz criterion    3308.943   Hannan-Quinn         3303.441 
rho                  0.507063   Durbin-Watson        0.976103 
 
  ------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Restriction: 
 b[const] = 0 
 




                 coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value   
  -------------------------------------------------------------- 
  const           0.000000     0.000000      NA       NA         
  Resid_GDP_RE    0.980058     0.0406967     24.08     2.08e-092 *** 
 
  Standard error of the regression = 2.95234 





Table AP16: Inflation Rate, POLS Model 
reg act_infl fc_infl d_20002-d_20102 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     660 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 22,   637) =   47.43 
       Model |  59634.4006    22  2710.65457           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  36402.4182   637  57.1466533           R-squared     =  0.6210 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6079 
       Total |  96036.8188   659  145.731136           Root MSE      =  7.5595 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    act_infl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     fc_infl |   .7190154   .0235527    30.53   0.000     .6727651    .7652658 
     d_20002 |  -4.588277   1.957643    -2.34   0.019    -8.432491   -.7440631 
     d_20011 |  -6.369828   1.952339    -3.26   0.001    -10.20363    -2.53603 
     d_20012 |  -5.127632   1.951866    -2.63   0.009    -8.960502   -1.294761 
     d_20021 |   -6.18582   1.952487    -3.17   0.002    -10.01991   -2.351731 
     d_20022 |  -6.693855   1.952164    -3.43   0.001    -10.52731     -2.8604 
     d_20031 |  -7.373159   1.952756    -3.78   0.000    -11.20778   -3.538542 
     d_20032 |  -7.521755   1.952615    -3.85   0.000    -11.35609   -3.687415 
     d_20041 |  -7.078413   1.953612    -3.62   0.000    -10.91471   -3.242115 
     d_20042 |  -7.226486   1.953422    -3.70   0.000    -11.06241   -3.390562 
     d_20051 |  -7.034938   1.954183    -3.60   0.000    -10.87236   -3.197518 
     d_20052 |  -7.252103   1.953845    -3.71   0.000    -11.08886   -3.415347 
     d_20061 |  -7.225351   1.954199    -3.70   0.000     -11.0628   -3.387901 
     d_20062 |  -7.459129   1.953662    -3.82   0.000    -11.29553   -3.622732 
     d_20071 |  -6.811662   1.953909    -3.49   0.001    -10.64854    -2.97478 
     d_20072 |  -7.045454   1.953585    -3.61   0.000     -10.8817   -3.209207 
     d_20081 |  -4.332372   1.953884    -2.22   0.027    -8.169205     -.49554 
     d_20082 |  -4.687087    1.95339    -2.40   0.017     -8.52295   -.8512236 
     d_20091 |  -8.941228   1.953424    -4.58   0.000    -12.77716     -5.1053 
     d_20092 |  -9.521504   1.952769    -4.88   0.000    -13.35615   -5.686861 
     d_20101 |  -7.014815   1.955667    -3.59   0.000    -10.85515   -3.174482 
     d_20102 |  -7.114289   1.955521    -3.64   0.000    -10.95434   -3.274241 
       _cons |   8.818274   1.391626     6.34   0.000     6.085544      11.551 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 






Table AP17: Inflation Rate, POLS Model with Robust Errors 
reg act_infl fc_infl d_20002-d_20102, robust 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     660 
                                                       F( 22,   637) =    9.39 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6210 
                                                       Root MSE      =  7.5595 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
    act_infl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     fc_infl |   .7190154   .0813452     8.84   0.000     .5592783    .8787526 
     d_20002 |  -4.588277   5.507682    -0.83   0.405    -15.40369    6.227131 
     d_20011 |  -6.369828   5.515491    -1.15   0.249    -17.20057    4.460914 
     d_20012 |  -5.127632   5.262264    -0.97   0.330    -15.46111    5.205851 
     d_20021 |   -6.18582   5.133894    -1.20   0.229    -16.26722    3.895583 
     d_20022 |  -6.693855   5.129076    -1.31   0.192     -16.7658    3.378086 
     d_20031 |  -7.373159   4.998044    -1.48   0.141    -17.18779    2.441477 
     d_20032 |  -7.521755   4.998726    -1.50   0.133    -17.33773    2.294219 
     d_20041 |  -7.078413   4.958699    -1.43   0.154    -16.81579    2.658959 
     d_20042 |  -7.226486   4.961931    -1.46   0.146    -16.97021    2.517234 
     d_20051 |  -7.034938   4.949125    -1.42   0.156    -16.75351    2.683634 
     d_20052 |  -7.252103   4.956226    -1.46   0.144    -16.98462    2.480413 
     d_20061 |  -7.225351   4.942533    -1.46   0.144    -16.93098    2.480277 
     d_20062 |  -7.459129   4.949448    -1.51   0.132    -17.17834    2.260077 
     d_20071 |  -6.811662   4.952858    -1.38   0.170    -16.53756    2.914241 
     d_20072 |  -7.045454   4.953555    -1.42   0.155    -16.77273    2.681818 
     d_20081 |  -4.332372   4.995482    -0.87   0.386    -14.14198    5.477231 
     d_20082 |  -4.687087   4.989974    -0.94   0.348    -14.48587    5.111701 
     d_20091 |  -8.941228   4.970249    -1.80   0.072    -18.70128    .8188244 
     d_20092 |  -9.521504   4.985762    -1.91   0.057    -19.31202    .2690127 
     d_20101 |  -7.014815   4.906981    -1.43   0.153    -16.65063    2.620999 
     d_20102 |  -7.114289   4.910704    -1.45   0.148    -16.75741    2.528837 
       _cons |   8.818274   4.852268     1.82   0.070    -.7101006    18.34665 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 





Table AP18: Inflation Rate, VIF Test for POLS Model 
vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
     d_20002 |      1.92    0.520722 
     d_20101 |      1.92    0.521775 
     d_20102 |      1.92    0.521853 
     d_20061 |      1.91    0.522559 
     d_20051 |      1.91    0.522567 
     d_20071 |      1.91    0.522714 
     d_20081 |      1.91    0.522728 
     d_20052 |      1.91    0.522748 
     d_20062 |      1.91    0.522846 
     d_20041 |      1.91    0.522873 
     d_20072 |      1.91    0.522887 
     d_20091 |      1.91    0.522974 
     d_20042 |      1.91    0.522975 
     d_20082 |      1.91    0.522992 
     d_20092 |      1.91    0.523325 
     d_20031 |      1.91    0.523332 
     d_20032 |      1.91    0.523407 
     d_20021 |      1.91    0.523476 
     d_20011 |      1.91    0.523555 
     d_20022 |      1.91    0.523649 
     d_20012 |      1.91    0.523809 
     fc_infl |      1.04    0.960808 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.87 





Table AP19: Inflation Rate, LSDV Model with Year & Country-Dummies 
reg act_infl fc_infl d_20002-d_20102 d_country2-d_country30 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     660 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 51,   608) =   25.56 
       Model |   65492.427    51  1284.16523           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  30544.3919   608  50.2374866           R-squared     =  0.6820 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6553 
       Total |  96036.8188   659  145.731136           Root MSE      =  7.0878 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    act_infl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     fc_infl |   .5819715     .02622    22.20   0.000     .5304788    .6334642 
     d_20002 |  -3.713754   1.837705    -2.02   0.044    -7.322775   -.1047337 
     d_20011 |  -6.119541   1.830699    -3.34   0.001    -9.714802    -2.52428 
     d_20012 |   -5.11347   1.830075    -2.79   0.005    -8.707505   -1.519436 
     d_20021 |  -6.472516   1.830894    -3.54   0.000    -10.06816   -2.876871 
     d_20022 |  -6.892614   1.830468    -3.77   0.000    -10.48742   -3.297807 
     d_20031 |  -7.716271    1.83125    -4.21   0.000    -11.31261   -4.119928 
     d_20032 |  -7.836545   1.831063    -4.28   0.000    -11.43252   -4.240568 
     d_20041 |  -7.559026   1.832381    -4.13   0.000    -11.15759   -3.960461 
     d_20042 |  -7.680147    1.83213    -4.19   0.000    -11.27822   -4.082076 
     d_20051 |  -7.588641   1.833136    -4.14   0.000    -11.18869   -3.988594 
     d_20052 |  -7.763779   1.832689    -4.24   0.000    -11.36295    -4.16461 
     d_20061 |  -7.780882   1.833156    -4.24   0.000    -11.38097   -4.180794 
     d_20062 |  -7.946594   1.832448    -4.34   0.000    -11.54529   -4.347899 
     d_20071 |  -7.331561   1.832774    -4.00   0.000     -10.9309   -3.732225 
     d_20072 |  -7.522412   1.832346    -4.11   0.000    -11.12091   -3.923916 
     d_20081 |  -4.849074   1.832741    -2.65   0.008    -8.448344   -1.249803 
     d_20082 |  -5.136179   1.832089    -2.80   0.005    -8.734169   -1.538189 
     d_20091 |  -9.395186   1.832132    -5.13   0.000    -12.99326    -5.79711 
     d_20092 |  -9.867174   1.831267    -5.39   0.000    -13.46355   -6.270797 
     d_20101 |  -7.723994   1.835096    -4.21   0.000    -11.32789   -4.120099 
     d_20102 |   -7.80975   1.834903    -4.26   0.000    -11.41327   -4.206232 
  d_country2 |   .7329028   2.137158     0.34   0.732    -3.464205    4.930011 
  d_country3 |   .0156065   2.137454     0.01   0.994    -4.182083    4.213296 
  d_country4 |   13.03781   2.298773     5.67   0.000     8.523311    17.55231 
  d_country5 |   .2849364   2.137463     0.13   0.894     -3.91277    4.482643 
  d_country6 |   3.015224   2.137197     1.41   0.159     -1.18196    7.212407 
  d_country7 |   .0148715   2.137276     0.01   0.994    -4.182467     4.21221 
  d_country8 |   1.459678   2.137065     0.68   0.495    -2.737246    5.656602 
  d_country9 |  -.1429233    2.13737    -0.07   0.947    -4.340448    4.054601 
 d_country10 |   .0398185   2.137494     0.02   0.985     -4.15795    4.237587 
 d_country11 |   2.055204   2.137789     0.96   0.337    -2.143142    6.253551 
 d_country12 |   .0767957   2.137585     0.04   0.971    -4.121151    4.274742 
 d_country13 |   2.242461   2.137484     1.05   0.295    -1.955287    6.440208 
 d_country14 |    .447136   2.137302     0.21   0.834    -3.750255    4.644527 
 d_country15 |   2.015276   2.137122     0.94   0.346    -2.181761    6.212313 
 d_country16 |   .2788293   2.137083     0.13   0.896     -3.91813    4.475789 
 d_country17 |   .3928572    2.13733     0.18   0.854    -3.804588    4.590302 
 d_country18 |   6.013859    2.14085     2.81   0.005     1.809502    10.21822 
 d_country19 |   .1622903   2.137346     0.08   0.939    -4.035186    4.359766 
 d_country20 |  -.1288408   2.137196    -0.06   0.952    -4.326023    4.068341 
 d_country21 |   .3523004   2.137106     0.16   0.869    -3.844706    4.549306 
 d_country22 |   .3284668   2.137238     0.15   0.878    -3.868798    4.525732 
 d_country23 |   8.075805   2.147096     3.76   0.000     3.859181    12.29243 
 d_country24 |   5.582029   2.148554     2.60   0.010     1.362541    9.801516 
 d_country25 |   .5395927   2.137138     0.25   0.801    -3.657475     4.73666 
 d_country26 |  -.1886457   2.137333    -0.09   0.930    -4.386097    4.008805 
 d_country27 |  -.5858485   2.137798    -0.27   0.784    -4.784214    3.612517 
 d_country28 |   11.21001   2.167318     5.17   0.000     6.953669    15.46635 
 d_country29 |   5.655815    2.14622     2.64   0.009     1.440912    9.870719 
 d_country30 |   .0709803   2.137221     0.03   0.974    -4.126252    4.268213 





. test d_country30 d_country29 d_country28 d_country27 d_country26 d_country25 
d_country24 d_country23 d_country22 d_country21 d_country20 d_country19 
d_country18 d_country17 d_country16 d_country15 d_country14 d_country13 
d_country12 d_country11 d_country10 d_country9 d_country8 d_country7 d_country6 
d_country5 d_country4 d_country3 d_country2 
 
 ( 1)  d_country30 = 0 
 ( 2)  d_country29 = 0 
 ( 3)  d_country28 = 0 
 ( 4)  d_country27 = 0 
 ( 5)  d_country26 = 0 
 ( 6)  d_country25 = 0 
 ( 7)  d_country24 = 0 
 ( 8)  d_country23 = 0 
 ( 9)  d_country22 = 0 
 (10)  d_country21 = 0 
 (11)  d_country20 = 0 
 (12)  d_country19 = 0 
 (13)  d_country18 = 0 
 (14)  d_country17 = 0 
 (15)  d_country16 = 0 
 (16)  d_country15 = 0 
 (17)  d_country14 = 0 
 (18)  d_country13 = 0 
 (19)  d_country12 = 0 
 (20)  d_country11 = 0 
 (21)  d_country10 = 0 
 (22)  d_country9 = 0 
 (23)  d_country8 = 0 
 (24)  d_country7 = 0 
 (25)  d_country6 = 0 
 (26)  d_country5 = 0 
 (27)  d_country4 = 0 
 (28)  d_country3 = 0 
 (29)  d_country2 = 0 
 
       F( 29,   608) =    4.02 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 








Table AP20: Inflation Rate, LSDV Model with Country-Clusters 
reg act_infl fc_infl d_20002-d_20102 d_country2-d_country30, cluster(country) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     660 
                                                       F( 21,    29) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6820 
                                                       Root MSE      =  7.0878 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 30 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
    act_infl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     fc_infl |   .5819715   .0293541    19.83   0.000     .5219356    .6420075 
     d_20002 |  -3.713754   4.345896    -0.85   0.400    -12.60211    5.174601 
     d_20011 |  -6.119541   6.287992    -0.97   0.338    -18.97993    6.740848 
     d_20012 |   -5.11347   5.092633    -1.00   0.324    -15.52908    5.302134 
     d_20021 |  -6.472516   4.589269    -1.41   0.169    -15.85863    2.913594 
     d_20022 |  -6.892614   4.578186    -1.51   0.143    -16.25606    2.470827 
     d_20031 |  -7.716271   4.914999    -1.57   0.127    -17.76857     2.33603 
     d_20032 |  -7.836545   4.919945    -1.59   0.122    -17.89896    2.225873 
     d_20041 |  -7.559026   5.216514    -1.45   0.158      -18.228    3.109944 
     d_20042 |  -7.680147   5.307327    -1.45   0.159    -18.53485    3.174554 
     d_20051 |  -7.588641   5.377588    -1.41   0.169    -18.58704    3.409761 
     d_20052 |  -7.763779    5.44222    -1.43   0.164    -18.89437    3.366811 
     d_20061 |  -7.780882   5.456945    -1.43   0.165    -18.94159    3.379824 
     d_20062 |  -7.946594   5.498358    -1.45   0.159      -19.192    3.298811 
     d_20071 |  -7.331561   5.489772    -1.34   0.192     -18.5594    3.896283 
     d_20072 |  -7.522412   5.396252    -1.39   0.174    -18.55899    3.514162 
     d_20081 |  -4.849074   5.359863    -0.90   0.373    -15.81122    6.113077 
     d_20082 |  -5.136179   5.242774    -0.98   0.335    -15.85886    5.586497 
     d_20091 |  -9.395186   5.182977    -1.81   0.080    -19.99557    1.205193 
     d_20092 |  -9.867174    5.17985    -1.90   0.067    -20.46116    .7268085 
     d_20101 |  -7.723994   5.393682    -1.43   0.163    -18.75531    3.307324 
     d_20102 |   -7.80975   5.450226    -1.43   0.163    -18.95671    3.337214 
  d_country2 |   .7329028   .0223999    32.72   0.000       .68709    .7787157 
  d_country3 |   .0156065   .0457124     0.34   0.735    -.0778858    .1090989 
  d_country4 |   13.03781   .9481824    13.75   0.000     11.09856    14.97706 
  d_country5 |   .2849364   .0461967     6.17   0.000     .1904535    .3794193 
  d_country6 |   3.015224   .0266229   113.26   0.000     2.960774    3.069674 
  d_country7 |   .0148715   .0336318     0.44   0.662    -.0539133    .0836563 
  d_country8 |   1.459678   .0008206  1778.84   0.000        1.458    1.461356 
  d_country9 |  -.1429233   .0404767    -3.53   0.001    -.2257074   -.0601392 
 d_country10 |   .0398185    .048002     0.83   0.414    -.0583566    .1379936 
 d_country11 |   2.055204   .0622935    32.99   0.000       1.9278    2.182609 
 d_country12 |   .0767957   .0528201     1.45   0.157    -.0312335    .1848249 
 d_country13 |   2.242461   .0474056    47.30   0.000     2.145505    2.339416 
 d_country14 |    .447136   .0356879    12.53   0.000     .3741459     .520126 
 d_country15 |   2.015276   .0175458   114.86   0.000     1.979391    2.051161 
 d_country16 |   .2788293   .0098843    28.21   0.000     .2586135     .299045 
 d_country17 |   .3928572    .037696    10.42   0.000     .3157602    .4699543 
 d_country18 |   6.013859   .1424609    42.21   0.000     5.722494    6.305224 
 d_country19 |   .1622903   .0388115     4.18   0.000     .0829119    .2416687 
 d_country20 |  -.1288408   .0265321    -4.86   0.000    -.1831051   -.0745765 
 d_country21 |   .3523004   .0149653    23.54   0.000      .321693    .3829078 
 d_country22 |   .3284668   .0305163    10.76   0.000      .266054    .3908796 
 d_country23 |   8.075805   .2320871    34.80   0.000     7.601134    8.550476 
 d_country24 |   5.582029   .2484226    22.47   0.000     5.073947     6.09011 
 d_country25 |   .5395927    .019802    27.25   0.000      .499093    .5800924 
 d_country26 |  -.1886457   .0379229    -4.97   0.000    -.2662067   -.1110847 
 d_country27 |  -.5858485   .0627058    -9.34   0.000    -.7140961   -.4576008 
 d_country28 |   11.21001   .4040009    27.75   0.000     10.38373    12.03628 
 d_country29 |   5.655815   .2216984    25.51   0.000     5.202391     6.10924 
 d_country30 |   .0709803   .0289992     2.45   0.021     .0116703    .1302904 
       _cons |   7.753018   5.028346     1.54   0.134    -2.531104    18.03714 
Source: Author’s computations in STATA 
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Table AP21: Inflation Rate, VIF Test for the LSDV Model 
vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
  d_country4 |      2.24    0.447030 
 d_country28 |      1.99    0.502902 
 d_country24 |      1.95    0.511724 
 d_country23 |      1.95    0.512419 
 d_country29 |      1.95    0.512838 
 d_country18 |      1.94    0.515414 
 d_country27 |      1.93    0.516886 
 d_country11 |      1.93    0.516891 
 d_country12 |      1.93    0.516989 
 d_country10 |      1.93    0.517033 
 d_country13 |      1.93    0.517038 
  d_country5 |      1.93    0.517049 
  d_country3 |      1.93    0.517053 
  d_country9 |      1.93    0.517093 
 d_country19 |      1.93    0.517105 
 d_country26 |      1.93    0.517111 
 d_country17 |      1.93    0.517113 
 d_country14 |      1.93    0.517126 
  d_country7 |      1.93    0.517139 
 d_country22 |      1.93    0.517157 
 d_country30 |      1.93    0.517165 
  d_country6 |      1.93    0.517177 
 d_country20 |      1.93    0.517178 
  d_country2 |      1.93    0.517196 
 d_country25 |      1.93    0.517206 
 d_country15 |      1.93    0.517214 
 d_country21 |      1.93    0.517221 
 d_country16 |      1.93    0.517233 
  d_country8 |      1.93    0.517241 
     d_20002 |      1.93    0.519467 
     d_20101 |      1.92    0.520946 
     d_20102 |      1.92    0.521055 
     d_20061 |      1.92    0.522049 
     d_20051 |      1.92    0.522060 
     d_20071 |      1.91    0.522267 
     d_20081 |      1.91    0.522285 
     d_20052 |      1.91    0.522315 
     d_20062 |      1.91    0.522453 
     d_20041 |      1.91    0.522490 
     d_20072 |      1.91    0.522510 
     d_20091 |      1.91    0.522632 
     d_20042 |      1.91    0.522634 
     d_20082 |      1.91    0.522657 
     d_20092 |      1.91    0.523126 
     d_20031 |      1.91    0.523136 
     d_20032 |      1.91    0.523243 
     d_20021 |      1.91    0.523339 
     d_20011 |      1.91    0.523451 
     d_20022 |      1.91    0.523583 
     d_20012 |      1.91    0.523808 
     fc_infl |      1.47    0.681540 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.92 





Table AP22: Inflation Rate, RE Model 
xtreg act_infl fc_infl d_20002-d_20102, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       660 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        30 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5015                         Obs per group: min =        22 
       between = 0.9669                                        avg =      22.0 
       overall = 0.6210                                        max =        22 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(22)      =   1043.53 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    act_infl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     fc_infl |   .7190154   .0235527    30.53   0.000     .6728529    .7651779 
     d_20002 |  -4.588277   1.957643    -2.34   0.019    -8.425187   -.7513673 
     d_20011 |  -6.369828   1.952339    -3.26   0.001    -10.19634   -2.543314 
     d_20012 |  -5.127632   1.951866    -2.63   0.009     -8.95322   -1.302044 
     d_20021 |   -6.18582   1.952487    -3.17   0.002    -10.01262   -2.359016 
     d_20022 |  -6.693855   1.952164    -3.43   0.001    -10.52003   -2.867684 
     d_20031 |  -7.373159   1.952756    -3.78   0.000    -11.20049   -3.545828 
     d_20032 |  -7.521755   1.952615    -3.85   0.000    -11.34881   -3.694701 
     d_20041 |  -7.078413   1.953612    -3.62   0.000    -10.90742   -3.249404 
     d_20042 |  -7.226486   1.953422    -3.70   0.000    -11.05512    -3.39785 
     d_20051 |  -7.034938   1.954183    -3.60   0.000    -10.86507   -3.204809 
     d_20052 |  -7.252103   1.953845    -3.71   0.000    -11.08157   -3.422637 
     d_20061 |  -7.225351   1.954199    -3.70   0.000    -11.05551   -3.395192 
     d_20062 |  -7.459129   1.953662    -3.82   0.000    -11.28824   -3.630022 
     d_20071 |  -6.811662   1.953909    -3.49   0.000    -10.64125   -2.982071 
     d_20072 |  -7.045454   1.953585    -3.61   0.000    -10.87441   -3.216496 
     d_20081 |  -4.332372   1.953884    -2.22   0.027    -8.161915   -.5028302 
     d_20082 |  -4.687087    1.95339    -2.40   0.016    -8.515661   -.8585119 
     d_20091 |  -8.941228   1.953424    -4.58   0.000    -12.76987   -5.112588 
     d_20092 |  -9.521504   1.952769    -4.88   0.000    -13.34886   -5.694147 
     d_20101 |  -7.014815   1.955667    -3.59   0.000    -10.84785   -3.181779 
     d_20102 |  -7.114289   1.955521    -3.64   0.000    -10.94704   -3.281538 
       _cons |   8.818274   1.391626     6.34   0.000     6.090736    11.54581 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |  7.0878408 
         rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
. estimates store random 






Table AP23: Inflation Rate, FE Model 
xtreg act_infl fc_infl d_20002-d_20102, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       660 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        30 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5047                         Obs per group: min =        22 
       between = 0.9669                                        avg =      22.0 
       overall = 0.6178                                        max =        22 
 
                                                F(22,608)          =     28.16 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.4582                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    act_infl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     fc_infl |   .5819715     .02622    22.20   0.000     .5304788    .6334642 
     d_20002 |  -3.713754   1.837705    -2.02   0.044    -7.322775   -.1047337 
     d_20011 |  -6.119541   1.830699    -3.34   0.001    -9.714802    -2.52428 
     d_20012 |   -5.11347   1.830075    -2.79   0.005    -8.707505   -1.519436 
     d_20021 |  -6.472516   1.830894    -3.54   0.000    -10.06816   -2.876871 
     d_20022 |  -6.892614   1.830468    -3.77   0.000    -10.48742   -3.297807 
     d_20031 |  -7.716271    1.83125    -4.21   0.000    -11.31261   -4.119928 
     d_20032 |  -7.836545   1.831063    -4.28   0.000    -11.43252   -4.240568 
     d_20041 |  -7.559026   1.832381    -4.13   0.000    -11.15759   -3.960461 
     d_20042 |  -7.680147    1.83213    -4.19   0.000    -11.27822   -4.082076 
     d_20051 |  -7.588641   1.833136    -4.14   0.000    -11.18869   -3.988594 
     d_20052 |  -7.763779   1.832689    -4.24   0.000    -11.36295    -4.16461 
     d_20061 |  -7.780882   1.833156    -4.24   0.000    -11.38097   -4.180794 
     d_20062 |  -7.946594   1.832448    -4.34   0.000    -11.54529   -4.347899 
     d_20071 |  -7.331561   1.832774    -4.00   0.000     -10.9309   -3.732225 
     d_20072 |  -7.522412   1.832346    -4.11   0.000    -11.12091   -3.923916 
     d_20081 |  -4.849074   1.832741    -2.65   0.008    -8.448344   -1.249803 
     d_20082 |  -5.136179   1.832089    -2.80   0.005    -8.734169   -1.538189 
     d_20091 |  -9.395186   1.832132    -5.13   0.000    -12.99326    -5.79711 
     d_20092 |  -9.867174   1.831267    -5.39   0.000    -13.46355   -6.270797 
     d_20101 |  -7.723994   1.835096    -4.21   0.000    -11.32789   -4.120099 
     d_20102 |   -7.80975   1.834903    -4.26   0.000    -11.41327   -4.206232 
       _cons |   9.854828   1.309165     7.53   0.000     7.283794    12.42586 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  3.4949115 
     sigma_e |  7.0878408 
         rho |  .19558105   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(29, 608) =     4.02             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
. estimates store fixed 






Table AP24: Inflation Rate, Test for Fixed Effects 
. test d_20002 d_20011 d_20012 d_20021 d_20022 d_20031 d_20032 d_20041 d_20042 
d_20051 d_20052 d_20061 d_20062 d_20071 d_20072 d_20081 d_20082 d_20091 d_20092 
d_20101 d_20102 
 
 ( 1)  d_20002 = 0 
 ( 2)  d_20011 = 0 
 ( 3)  d_20012 = 0 
 ( 4)  d_20021 = 0 
 ( 5)  d_20022 = 0 
 ( 6)  d_20031 = 0 
 ( 7)  d_20032 = 0 
 ( 8)  d_20041 = 0 
 ( 9)  d_20042 = 0 
 (10)  d_20051 = 0 
 (11)  d_20052 = 0 
 (12)  d_20061 = 0 
 (13)  d_20062 = 0 
 (14)  d_20071 = 0 
 (15)  d_20072 = 0 
 (16)  d_20081 = 0 
 (17)  d_20082 = 0 
 (18)  d_20091 = 0 
 (19)  d_20092 = 0 
 (20)  d_20101 = 0 
 (21)  d_20102 = 0 
 
       F( 21,   608) =    2.56 
            Prob > F =    0.0002 






Table AP25: Inflation Rate, Hausman Specification Test 
hausman fixed random 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |     fixed        random       Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     fc_infl |    .5819715     .7190154       -.1370439         .011522 
     d_20002 |   -3.713754    -4.588277        .8745227               . 
     d_20011 |   -6.119541    -6.369828        .2502878               . 
     d_20012 |    -5.11347    -5.127632        .0141612               . 
     d_20021 |   -6.472516     -6.18582       -.2866958               . 
     d_20022 |   -6.892614    -6.693855       -.1987593               . 
     d_20031 |   -7.716271    -7.373159       -.3431122               . 
     d_20032 |   -7.836545    -7.521755       -.3147898               . 
     d_20041 |   -7.559026    -7.078413       -.4806129               . 
     d_20042 |   -7.680147    -7.226486       -.4536609               . 
     d_20051 |   -7.588641    -7.034938        -.553703               . 
     d_20052 |   -7.763779    -7.252103       -.5116762               . 
     d_20061 |   -7.780882    -7.225351       -.5555302               . 
     d_20062 |   -7.946594    -7.459129       -.4874651               . 
     d_20071 |   -7.331561    -6.811662       -.5198988               . 
     d_20072 |   -7.522412    -7.045454       -.4769584               . 
     d_20081 |   -4.849074    -4.332372       -.5167011               . 
     d_20082 |   -5.136179    -4.687087       -.4490928               . 
     d_20091 |   -9.395186    -8.941228       -.4539579               . 
     d_20092 |   -9.867174    -9.521504       -.3456704               . 
     d_20101 |   -7.723994    -7.014815       -.7091793               . 
     d_20102 |    -7.80975    -7.114289       -.6954612               . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                 chi2(22) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =      141.47 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 










Table AP26: Inflation Rate, Robust FE Model 
xtreg act_infl fc_infl d_20002-d_20102, robust fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       660 
Group variable: country                         Number of groups   =        30 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5047                         Obs per group: min =        22 
       between = 0.9669                                        avg =      22.0 
       overall = 0.6178                                        max =        22 
 
                                                F(22,29)           =  14188.24 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.4582                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 30 clusters in country) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
    act_infl |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     fc_infl |   .5819715   .0286782    20.29   0.000     .5233181    .6406249 
     d_20002 |  -3.713754   4.245819    -0.87   0.389    -12.39743     4.96992 
     d_20011 |  -6.119541   6.143192    -1.00   0.327    -18.68378    6.444697 
     d_20012 |   -5.11347    4.97536    -1.03   0.313    -15.28922    5.062283 
     d_20021 |  -6.472516   4.483587    -1.44   0.160    -15.64248     2.69745 
     d_20022 |  -6.892614   4.472759    -1.54   0.134    -16.04043    2.255205 
     d_20031 |  -7.716271   4.801816    -1.61   0.119    -17.53709    2.104545 
     d_20032 |  -7.836545   4.806648    -1.63   0.114    -17.66724    1.994155 
     d_20041 |  -7.559026   5.096388    -1.48   0.149    -17.98231    2.864258 
     d_20042 |  -7.680147   5.185109    -1.48   0.149    -18.28489    2.924591 
     d_20051 |  -7.588641   5.253752    -1.44   0.159    -18.33377    3.156489 
     d_20052 |  -7.763779   5.316896    -1.46   0.155    -18.63805    3.110495 
     d_20061 |  -7.780882   5.331282    -1.46   0.155    -18.68458    3.122814 
     d_20062 |  -7.946594   5.371741    -1.48   0.150    -18.93304    3.039851 
     d_20071 |  -7.331561   5.363353    -1.37   0.182    -18.30085    3.637727 
     d_20072 |  -7.522412   5.271986    -1.43   0.164    -18.30483    3.260011 
     d_20081 |  -4.849074   5.236435    -0.93   0.362    -15.55879    5.860639 
     d_20082 |  -5.136179   5.122043    -1.00   0.324    -15.61193    5.339574 
     d_20091 |  -9.395186   5.063623    -1.86   0.074    -19.75146    .9610865 
     d_20092 |  -9.867174   5.060568    -1.95   0.061     -20.2172    .4828492 
     d_20101 |  -7.723994   5.269476    -1.47   0.153    -18.50128    3.053294 
     d_20102 |   -7.80975   5.324718    -1.47   0.153    -18.70002     3.08052 
       _cons |   9.854828   4.965399     1.98   0.057    -.3005528    20.01021 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  3.4949115 
     sigma_e |  7.0878408 
         rho |  .19558105   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------  









Table AP27: Inflation Rate, LSDV Model: Test for Efficiency 
Restriction set 
 1: b[const] = 0 
 2: b[Fc_Infl] = 1 
 




                coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value  
  ------------------------------------------------------------ 
  const           0.000000     0.000000    NA        NA        
  Fc_Infl         1.00000      0.000000    NA        NA        
  d_2000_2       -4.03390      1.93536     -2.084     0.0375   ** 
  d_2001_1       -4.53556      1.93536     -2.344     0.0194   ** 
  d_2001_2       -2.80923      1.93536     -1.452     0.1471   
  d_2002_1       -3.25056      1.93536     -1.680     0.0936   * 
  d_2002_2       -3.93890      1.93536     -2.035     0.0423   ** 
  d_2003_1       -4.32223      1.93536     -2.233     0.0259   ** 
  d_2003_2       -4.52890      1.93536     -2.340     0.0196   ** 
  d_2004_1       -3.74556      1.93536     -1.935     0.0534   * 
  d_2004_2       -3.94890      1.93536     -2.040     0.0417   ** 
  d_2005_1       -3.55223      1.93536     -1.835     0.0669   * 
  d_2005_2       -3.85556      1.93536     -1.992     0.0468   ** 
  d_2006_1       -3.73890      1.93536     -1.932     0.0538   * 
  d_2006_2       -4.11223      1.93536     -2.125     0.0340   ** 
  d_2007_1       -3.39826      1.93536     -1.756     0.0796   * 
  d_2007_2       -3.72010      1.93536     -1.922     0.0550   * 
  d_2008_1       -0.925531     1.93536     -0.4782    0.6327   
  d_2008_2       -1.41886      1.93536     -0.7331    0.4638   
  d_2009_1       -5.66303      1.93536     -2.926     0.0036   *** 
  d_2009_2       -6.46533      1.93536     -3.341     0.0009   *** 
  d_2010_1       -3.21333      1.93536     -1.660     0.0974   * 
  d_2010_2       -3.34093      1.93536     -1.726     0.0848   * 
  d_country2      3.61496      2.14403      1.686     0.0923   * 
  d_country3      3.86764      2.14403      1.804     0.0717   * 
  d_country4      2.73591      2.14403      1.276     0.2024   
  d_country5      4.14387      2.14403      1.933     0.0537   * 
  d_country6      5.83714      2.14403      2.723     0.0067   *** 
  d_country7      3.69487      2.14403      1.723     0.0853   * 
  d_country8      4.67241      2.14403      2.179     0.0297   ** 
  d_country9      3.63455      2.14403      1.695     0.0905   * 
  d_country10     3.92446      2.14403      1.830     0.0677   * 
  d_country11     4.36914      2.14403      2.038     0.0420   ** 
  d_country12     4.03005      2.14403      1.880     0.0606   * 
  d_country13     4.76841      2.14403      2.224     0.0265   ** 
  d_country14     4.15641      2.14403      1.939     0.0530   * 
  d_country15     4.96646      2.14403      2.316     0.0209   ** 
  d_country16     3.62064      2.14403      1.689     0.0918   * 
  d_country17     4.13073      2.14403      1.927     0.0545   * 
  d_country18     7.18614      2.14403      3.352     0.0009   *** 
  d_country19     3.91605      2.14403      1.826     0.0683   * 
  d_country20     3.45005      2.14403      1.609     0.1081   
  d_country21     3.34023      2.14403      1.558     0.1198   
  d_country22     3.96409      2.14403      1.849     0.0650   * 
  d_country23     7.97173      2.14403      3.718     0.0002   *** 
  d_country24     5.24532      2.14403      2.446     0.0147   ** 
  d_country25     4.02264      2.14403      1.876     0.0611   * 
  d_country26     3.55246      2.14403      1.657     0.0981   * 
  d_country27     3.50818      2.14403      1.636     0.1023   
  d_country28     8.65773      2.14403      4.038     6.08e-05 *** 
  d_country29     5.69968      2.14403      2.658     0.0081   *** 
  d_country30     3.68500      2.14403      1.719     0.0862   * 
 
  Standard error of the regression = 8.46373 
Source: Author’s computations in GRETL 
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Table AP28: Inflation Rate, FE Model: Test for Efficiency 
Restriction set 
 1: b[const] = 0 
 2: b[Fc_Infl] = 1 
 
Test statistic: F(2, 608) = 493.071, with p-value = 5.47572e-128 





Table AP29: Inflation Rate, Forecast Errors 
Source: Author’s computations in Excel 
  
Country Average Error  Sum of Errors Maximum Error Minimum Error 
 
   
  
   
  
 
   
  
   
 
                  
Albania -0.3680 -8.0950 2.4000 -6.0000 
Armenia 0.0460 1.0110 5.2000 -8.7000 
Austria 0.2986 6.5700 1.5230 -1.8540 
Belarus -0.8331 -18.3280 139.000 -86.740 
Belgium 0.5749 12.6470 2.6930 -2.8420 
Bulgaria 2.2681 49.8990 8.3500 -4.5470 
Denmark 0.1259 2.7690 2.3280 -1.4810 
Estonia 1.1034 24.2750 5.0660 -5.1420 
Finland 0.0655 1.4420 2.3000 -1.6000 
France 0.3555 7.8200 1.3590 -1.5640 
Georgia 0.8001 17.6030 8.4070 -5.8730 
Germany 0.4610 10.1430 2.7000 -1.5160 
Hungary 1.1994 26.3870 5.2350 -1.6000 
Italy 0.5874 12.9230 4.7000 -3.0000 
Latvia 1.3975 30.7440 12.7520 -7.3770 
Lithuania 0.0516 1.1360 7.7380 -4.2000 
Luxembourg 0.5617 12.3580 1.8000 -1.4660 
Moldova 3.6171 79.5770 28.4900 -9.6600 
Netherlands 0.3470 7.6350 4.3000 -1.6160 
Norway -0.1190 -2.6170 1.5660 -2.1000 
Poland -0.2288 -5.0330 4.6000 -3.8000 
Portugal 0.3951 8.6920 2.5000 -2.9440 
Romania 4.4027 96.8600 28.9000 -3.8000 
Russia 1.6763 36.8790 6.8800 -3.0500 
Spain 0.4536 9.9800 1.4300 -3.2910 
Sweden -0.0165 -0.3640 1.9080 -1.3000 
Switzerland -0.0608 -1.3380 1.4300 -1.9830 
Turkey 5.0887 111.9520 37.4300 -18.7000 
UK 0.1160 2.5520 2.5630 -1.4000 
Ukraine 2.1307 46.8750 18.7700 -11.5000 
TOTAL 0.8833 582.9540 139.0000 -86.7400 
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Table AP30: Inflation Rate, LSDV Model: Test for Unbiasedness 
Pooled OLS, using 660 observations 
Included 30 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 22 
Dependent variable: Fc_Error_Infl 
 
                   coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value  
  --------------------------------------------------------------- 
  const             0.883264     0.191305      4.617    4.68e-06  *** 
  LSDV_infla_rsd    1.00000      0.0281211    35.56     2.42e-155 *** 
 
Mean dependent var   0.883264   S.D. dependent var   8.394486 
Sum squared resid    15893.62   S.E. of regression   4.914717 
R-squared            0.657745   Adjusted R-squared   0.657225 
F(1, 658)            1264.545   P-value(F)           2.4e-155 
Log-likelihood      -1986.372   Akaike criterion     3976.745 
Schwarz criterion    3985.729   Hannan-Quinn         3980.227 
rho                  0.500880   Durbin-Watson        0.908610 
  --------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Restriction: 
 b[const] = 0 
 




                   coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value   
  ---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  const             0.000000     0.000000      NA       NA         
  LSDV_infla_rsd    1.00000      0.0285513     35.02     1.37e-152 *** 
 
  Standard error of the regression = 4.9899 





Table AP31: Inflation Rate, FE Model: Test for Unbiasedness 
Pooled OLS, using 660 observations 
Included 30 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 22 
Dependent variable: Fc_Error_Infl 
 
                  coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value  
  -------------------------------------------------------------- 
  const            0.883264     0.191305      4.617    4.68e-06  *** 
  FE_infl_resid    1.00000      0.0281211    35.56     2.42e-155 *** 
 
Mean dependent var   0.883264   S.D. dependent var   8.394486 
Sum squared resid    15893.62   S.E. of regression   4.914717 
R-squared            0.657745   Adjusted R-squared   0.657225 
F(1, 658)            1264.545   P-value(F)           2.4e-155 
Log-likelihood      -1986.372   Akaike criterion     3976.745 
Schwarz criterion    3985.729   Hannan-Quinn         3980.227 
rho                  0.500880   Durbin-Watson        0.908610  
 
  -------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Restriction: 
 b[const] = 0 
 




                  coefficient   std. error   t-ratio    p-value   
  --------------------------------------------------------------- 
  const            0.000000     0.000000      NA       NA         
  FE_infl_resid    1.00000      0.0285513     35.02     1.37e-152 *** 
 
  Standard error of the regression = 4.9899 
Source: Author’s computations in GRETL 
 
 
 
 
 
